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The Muslim Secessionist Movement in Southern Philippines was for a time the most 
serious threat to the stability of the country. It had its beginnings in the late 1960s with 
the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement In the 1970s, the Moro National 
Liberation Front emerged as the lead secessionist organization. Through its military arm, 
the Bangsa Moro Army, the MNLF waged a furious war against central authority. The 
objective of the MNLF is to establish a separate state comprising the islands of Mindanao, 
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. 
The hostilities reached its peak in the mid 70s when the MNLF received foreign 
support from Libya and Sabah. The Marcos administration used a combination of 
military, socioeconomic development and diplomatic means to try to resolve the Muslim 
problem. Through the intercession of the Organization of Islamic Conference, peace 
negotiations between the government and the MNLF resulted in the signing of the Tripoli 
Agreement in 1976. A divergent interpretation of the autonomy issue caused a 
breakdown in negotiations and a resumption of hostilities. Corazon Aquino assumed the 
presidency after the February 1986 revolution. Her meeting with Nur Misuari, the MNLF 
Chairman, resulted in a ceasefire agreement in 1986. The peace negotiations however 
broke down because of rigid stand on both sides on the autonomy issue. 
The secessionist issue continues to be a daunting problem of the government in the 
1990s. The government of President Ramos renewed peace negotiations with the MNLF. 
Spearheading the government reconciliation effort is the National Unification 
Commission. This thesis will examine the issues and prospects of the Secessionist 
Movement in Southern Philippines in light of the developments in the country and in the 
international scene. Accesion For 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Muslim Secessionist Movement in Southern Philippines in the mid 1970's 
was the most serious threat to the stability of the country. In the 1990's, it continues to 
be a daunting problem for the Philippine government. The main objective of the 
movement is to create a separate Muslim state, while at the very least, it aims for the 
formation of a Muslim autonomous government for the region comprising the islands of 
Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. 
Muslim unrest traces its roots far back to the coming of the Spanish conquistadors 
in the 16th century. When the Spaniards established themselves in the Philippines, they 
converted the inhabitants to Christianity. This effectively rolled back the spread of Islam 
in the east. Catholic missionaries were successful in converting the people of Luzon and 
Visayas, however they failed to convert the inhabitants of Mindanao, Sulu, and Tawi- 
Tawi, where the Islamic faith was firmly established. The Moros (as the Spaniards 
called them) resisted all attempts at conversion to Catholicism. They stick to their own 
culture, social customs, and political organizations under the rule of Datus and Sultans. 
Their whole orientation was toward their Muslim communities and their relatives and 
neighbors to the south and west, not northwards toward the center of the country. The 
Spaniards tried to subjugate the Moros for almost 300 years and it was not until 1878 
that the Sultan of Sulu recognized the suzerainty of Spain. When the United States took 
over as colonizer in 1898, the Moros never formally accepted American rule. They 
staged several uprisings and ended up being separately administered. 
Moros came into the same orbit as the rest of the country with the adoption of the 
1935 Philippine Commonwealth Constitution. The Constitution provided for a single 
regime for the whole country. The Muslim leaders vainly petitioned Washington for 
separate treatment for they foresaw the dangers of a unified structure. 
From 1936 onwards the pressure of penetration from the Christian north was upon 
the Muslims. As land-hungry Christian settlers poured into Mindanao in the 1950s and 
1960s, communal tensions began to build up.   Grievances so accumulated during the 
1960's that Muslim leaders began thinking of ways to hold back Christian penetration. 
The Christian migration meant more than just the loss of land. Muslims feared more the 
threat of political subjugation and the possible extinction of their religion and way of life. 
Following the rise of Muslim-Christian land disputes, Christian settlers formed 
militia's called Ilagas (Rats) to protect and expand their political influence in the south. 
Muslims answered in kind with the formation of Muslim armed groups, the Barracudas 
in Cotabato and the Blackshirts in the Lanao provinces. Soon after, armed clashes 
between the armed groups forced Christian and Muslim communities to flee from their 
homes. The Philippine armed forces tried to intervene between the warring groups but 
the Muslims misinterpreted their action as sympathetic to the Christians. 
What followed was the formation of a separatist movement that seriously 
challenged the might of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the 1970's. The 
secessionist and independence aspirations of the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao began to 
be strongly manifested in 1968. The resultant action was the formation of the Muslim 
Independence Movement, later named Mindanao Independence Movement. The 
Movement was a coalition of the traditional leaders and politicians and Marxist-inspired 
students and ideologues. Eventually the young Turks of the movement broke away from 
the old guards and formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the late 
1960s. An MNLF led armed struggle in Southern Philippines began shortly after 
President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and peaked in the mid-1970s. 
After intense fighting, with no end in sight, both sides tried several approaches to end 
the fighting and find a way to resolve the problem. 
The problem assumed international dimension when Libya began supplying arms 
to the Moro National Liberation Front. Sabah state in neighboring Malaysia, under Tun 
Mustapha, served as conduit for funds and arms from the Middle East. It also served 
as training ground and sanctuary for rebels and refugees. Fear of an oil boycott that 
might be imposed by the oil producing members of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), forced the Philippine government to hold back on the use of military 
force and seek other means to find a lasting solution to the problem in the south. 
Pressure from the OIC led the Philippine government and the MNLF to the 
negotiating table. In December 1976, the two sides reached an uneasy compromise in 
Tripoli, Libya. The Tripoli Agreement promised autonomy to thirteen southern 
provinces in Mindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. A cease-fire resulting from the agreement 
held for a while but volatile disagreements over the carrying out of terms under the 
agreement caused a resumption of hostilities. 
There was a divergent interpretation of the Tripoli Agreement by the two parties. 
Nur Misuari, the MNLF chairman, interpreted the agreement as giving the Muslims a 
homeland free of Manila's control. It wanted prerogatives ranging from the symbolic 
(its own flag and official seal) to the highly substantive aspect of having its own military, 
judiciary and monetary system. 
The Philippine government rejected Nur Misuari's interpretation of the intent of 
the agreement since it comprises a de facto secession. It also rejected Misuari's position 
that the government recognizes outright the MNLF as the governing body of the new 
Muslim homeland. The President maintained that any changes in the political structure 
in the Muslim region should be subject to ratification from the people. 
After the Tripoli negotiations, President Marcos issued a decree requiring the 
holding of a referendum in the area. The MNLF boycotted the referendum, stressing that 
the Tripoli agreement did not include a provision for the holding of a referendum. 
Nonetheless the referendum passed and the voters rejected the formation of a single 
autonomous region and the right of the MNLF to approve the choice of Chief Minister 
for the proposed regional assembly. What emerged was a political structure that was to 
Manila's liking, two regional autonomous governments with little real authority. 
Several developments in the 1980s resulted in a decline in violence in the south. 
Misuari chose to remain outside the Philippines and was virtually cut of from the main 
stream of the local rebel leadership. War weariness set in on the MNLF organization 
and coupled with factional infighting, resulted in the splintering of the organization. 
There was also a marked reduction in foreign assistance to the rebels. 
In 1986, President Marcos was swept from power and replaced by Corazon 
Aquino, whose message of national reconciliation struck a resonant and hopeful note 
among the Muslims. The Aquino government, building upon contacts with Misuari 
forged during Marcos' rule, made overtures toward the MNLF to negotiate the future of 
the region. On September 1986, President Aquino met with Nur Misuari in Jolo. 
Subsequent talks stalled over the extent of the autonomous region and the means for 
creating it. The MNLF insisted on the granting of full autonomy to the islands of 
Mindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. On the other hand, the government wanted to limit the 
area to the provinces with Muslim majorities and only after the residents agreed in a 
plebiscite. 
No significant progress on the peace negotiations occurred for the rest of 
President Aquino's tenure. When the reins of the government passed on to President 
Fidel V. Ramos in 1992, no clear solution to the Muslim problem was in sight. 
The primary concern of the research is to discuss the issues that caused the 
secessionist movement in Southern Philippines, the rebel's strategy to create a separate 
state composed of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, and 
the strategy of the Philippine Government to resolve the Muslim Separatist Problem. 
Comparative analyses will be made with counter secessionist programs carried out in 
selected countries to assess the effectiveness of the government's approach in resolving 
the problem in Southern Philippines. 
To provide the readers with a thorough understanding of the Muslim problem, 
Chapter II is a presentation of the historical perspective of events and conditions that led 
to the formation of the Secessionist Movement. Chapter DI is a discussion of the 
strategy of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which provided the leadership 
for the Muslim secessionist movement in the Philippines. In Chapter IV, the discussion 
centers on the government's response to the problem. The counter secessionist efforts 
of selected countries and the comparative analysis are presented in Chapter V. The 
conclusion on the future of the secessionist movement in the Philippines is drawn from 
the counter secessionist scenarios analyzed in Chapters IV and V. 
H. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.   THE MUSLIM FILIPINOS 
The Muslim Filipinos, otherwise known as Moros, are the most significant 
minority in the otherwise homogeneous Philippine society. They represent roughly about 
5 per cent of the total population of the country, numbering approximately five million. 
Except the ruling classes who have Arabic traces, the Moros are basically Malayan like 
the rest of the people in the Philippines. 
1.  Ethnic Groupings 
The concentrations of Muslims are in the southern part of the country. Tribal 
descent and the place of domicile differentiate one group of Muslim from another. 
Maguindanaos are the Muslims who settled in Cotabato, starting from the Simuay 
Labangan area to Margosatubig. The Maranaos occupy the area around Lake Lanao, the 
northern coast of Iligan bay and the southern coasts of Lanao and Malabang. Agriculture 
is the primary means of livelihood of the Maguindanaos and Maranaos. The former 
practice wet-rice agriculture along the plains of the Cotabato River while the latter plant 
upland rice and corn. Iranons live in the region north of the Simuay River in Cotabato. 
The Yakans live in the Zamboanga area. They are also an upland rice people. Tausugs 
are the Muslims who live in the island of Sulu. Although they practice some agriculture, 
they rely mainly on fishing together with trading and piracy. Samals populate the rest 
of the islands of the Sulu archipelago, the province of Palawan and part of the provinces 
of Davao and Zamboanga del Sur. They concentrate almost entirely on agriculture. 
Bajaos are boat people and they rely mostly on the sea for a living, to a point where they 
seldom come ashore.' 
1
 Gowing, Peter, and McAmis, Robert., The Muslim Filipinos, Solidaridad 
Publishing House, Manila, 1974, p. 185. 
Before the arrival of the Spaniards, there were several sultanates of 
Maguindanaons, however only the sultanates of Maguindanao and Buayan were 
significant. The Tausugs under the Sultanate of Sulu claimed territorial domain over 
North Borneo, Palawan and the southern coast of Mindanao. In the Lanao area, there 
was extreme segmentation in the many sultanates of the Maranaos. Other Muslim groups 
like the Samals, Yakans and Badjaos had no independent political existence and were 
subject people.2 
2.  Introduction of Islam 
Islam was introduced in the Philippines in 1380 when an Arabian scholar by the 
name of Mudum began preaching the doctrines of Mohammed in the island of Sulu. In 
1390, a petty ruler of Menangkabaw, Sumatra by the name of Raja Baginda, arrived in 
Sulu and promptly converted some natives to Islam. Sayed Abu Bakr followed the 
example of Raja Baginda. He left Palembang around 1450, settled in Sulu and later 
married Baginda's daughter, Paramisuli. After Baginda's death, Abu Bakr established 
a government patterned after the Sultanate of Arabia. In the exercise of his powers as 
sultan, Islam spread rapidly to all parts of Sulu.3 
The man responsible for introducing Islam in the island of Mindanao was Sherif 
Muhammad Kabungsuan. He came from Johore, Malay Peninsula and on his arrival in 
Mindanao he converted many of the tribes to his religion. He married into an influential 
family, and made use of the relationship to install himself as the first sultan in Mindanao. 
It was during this period that the propagation of Islam in the Philippines spread rapidly 
to the Visayas and Luzon. The archipelago became the farthest expansion of an Islamic 
network that was partly religious, partly economic and partly political.4 
2
 Ibid., p. 16. 
3
 Glang, Alunan, Muslim Secession or Integration?, R.P. Publishing Co. Quezon 
City, 1969, p. 42. 
4
 Ibid., p. 41. 
Islamization of the archipelago caused the introduction of new laws, ethics and 
a new outlook in the meaning and direction of life. The Muslims in the Philippines 
gradually became an integral part of an expanding Islamic Malay world. They used the 
Arabic script for writing local languages, the Arabic language for rituals and theological 
matters and Malay language for commercial and court language. Muslim Filipinos 
became aware of their existence as part of a wider community that extends from 
Morocco to the Malay lands in the South China Sea.5 
B.   THE SPANISH COLONIAL PERIOD (1521-1898) 
1.    The Moro Wars 
The arrival of the Spaniards in the second half of the 16th century and the 
subsequent conquest of Luzon and the Visayan Islands led the Muslims to retreat to the 
south. There they defended and maintained their independence from foreign powers 
almost to the end of the Spanish regime. The conflict between the Muslims and the 
Spaniards became known as the Moro Wars. It was a series of bitter wars of attrition 
that spanned  more than three centuries.   There are six stages of the conflict. 
The first stage was the period of struggle between Brunei and Spain over political 
and commercial supremacy in the Philippines. Spain gained a secure foothold in the 
Philippines during this period. It was during this time that Rajah Soliman, the first 
Muslim Gatpuno of Manila lost to Martin de Goiti, the first Spaniard to set eyes on 
Manila as a Muslim kingdom in 1571. Spain gained full control of Manila with the 
defeat of Rajah Lakandula, the Muslim king of Tondo in 1578. This stage ended with 
the Spanish attack on Brunei causing Bornean influence in the Archipelago to wane.6 
Attempts of the Spaniards to establish a colony in Mindanao characterized the 
second stage of the 'Moro wars'. The Spaniards also tried to reduce the rulers of Sulu, 
Maguindanao, and Buayan into vassalage.    They tried to prohibit these rulers from 
5
 Gowing and McAmis,   Op. cit., p. 5. 
6
 Ibid., p. 1. 
admitting Muslim preachers and persuaded them to accept Christian missionaries. The 
Spaniards failed to colonize and Christianize the people of Mindanao, instead the 
designated Governor for Mindanao was killed in 1596. 
The early part of the seventeenth century marked the third stage of the 'Moro 
wars'. The Spaniards tried to gain control over the Visayas from the combined forces 
of the Maguindanao and Buayan sultanates. The Moros resorted to capturing Christian 
Filipinos and enslaving them to weaken the resolve of the Filipino to side with the 
Spaniards.  In using the slaves as boat rowers, the Moro war machine became stronger. 
In the fourth stage the Spaniards decided to conquer the sultanates in Mindanao 
and Sulu. Military expeditions launched by the Spaniards relied heavily on the use of 
the people that they conquered and Christianized. Thus, the Christian Filipinos were 
made to fight the Moros for the glory of Spain and the Christian faith. The Spaniards 
resorted more and more to the practice of burning Moro settlements, plantations, fields 
and orchards.    Captured Muslims were forced to work on the Spanish galleys. 
In Mindanao, Sultan Kudarat who held sway over the Maguindanaos from 
Sibuguey Bay to the Gulf of Davao, fought the incursions of the Spaniards into his 
domain. He consolidated his power by uniting the warring warlords in the Pulangi area, 
took the title of Sultan and declared a Jihad or Holy war against the colonizers. 
In a gathering of Maranao datus and sultans in 1623, Sultan Kudarat, delivered 
the noblest sentiments of the Muslim people. He urged the Maranaos to continue 
fighting the Spaniards for encroaching on their ancient liberty and lovely lands. This 
speech preserved for us by Spanish chronicles reads: 
You men of the lake, forgetting your ancient liberty, have 
submitted to the Castillans. Submission is sheer stupidity. You cannot 
realize to what your surrender binds you. You are selling yourselves to 
toil for the benefit of these foreigners. 
Look at the regions that have already submitted to them. Note how 
abject is the misery to which their peoples are now reduced. Behold the 
condition of the Tagalogs and of the Bisayans whose chiefs are trampled 
upon by the meanest Castillans. If you are no better spirit than them, then 
you must expect similar treatment. You, like them, will be obliged to row 
the galleys. Just as they do, you have to toil at the shipbuilding and labor 
without ceasing on the other public works. You can see for yourselves that 
you will experience the hardest treatment thus employed. 
Be men. Let me aid you to resist. All the strength of my 
sultanate, I promise you shall be in your defense. 
What matters if the Castillans at first are successful? That means 
only the loss of a year's harvest. Do you think that is too dear a prize to 
pay for liberty?7 
Incessant operations of the Spaniards led to the fall of Sultan Kudarat's capital in 
Lamitan, Basilan in 1637. The Sultan and his people retired to the interior and adopted 
a policy of minimum confrontation with the Spaniards. This policy was adopted to 
prevent the extermination of the Maguindanaos as a people. The following year the 
Sultan of Sulu's strong hold in Jolo also fell. The Sulus followed the course of action 
of the Maguindanaos of retiring to the interior or transferring to other islands to avoid 
extermination by the Spaniards. Although the Spaniards captured the strongholds of the 
two sultans, the threat of Muslim retaliation led them to make peace with Maguindanao 
in 1645 and with Sulu in 1646. The treaty between the Spaniards and Maguindanao 
recognized the sphere of influence of Sultan Kudarat covering the area from Sibuguey 
(just off Zamboanga City) to the Davao Gulf and extending to the interior including most 
of the Maranao territory, and to the inhabitants of the upper reaches and tributary stream 
of the Pulangi river. The treaty with the Sulus called for the departure of the Spaniards 
from the island of Jolo. 
War between the Maguindanaos and the Spaniards resumed in 1656. It was 
precipitated by Spanish provocations in territories tributary to Sultan Kudarat and 
continuous efforts to convert the people to Christianity. The Koxinga threat to Manila 
forced the Spaniards to abandon the Zamboanga fort in 1663. There was relative peace 
between the Spaniards and the Moros for the next fifty years. 
The fifth stage of the 'Moro Wars' started with the rearming of Zamboanga in 
1718. In an attempt to reduce the Muslims as vassals, the Spaniards tried to convert the 
sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao.   Conversion of the datus and other subjects was the 
7
 Glang, Alunan, Op. cit., p. 9. 
next step. The plan did not materialize. The Moros reacted by launching a devastating 
attack on the northern and central islands of the Philippines. Moro raids caused 
widespread disruption of the economic life in the areas under the Spanish colonial 
regime. In response to the Spanish policy of enslaving captured Muslims, the Moros 
retaliated by taking thousands of captives in the Visayan islands. In time the word 
"Moro" evoked hatred and terror, especially to people living along the coasts. While the 
Christian Filipinos relied on Spain for protection from their dreaded enemy, the Moros 
turned more to each other and to their neighbors in Sumatra and Borneo.8 
The sixth stage of the 'Moro wars' occurred in the nineteenth century when Sulu 
became the focus of European rivalry. French interest to establish a naval base in 
Basilan in the 1850's and renewed trade interest of the British alarmed the Spaniards. 
An expedition to Sulu in 1851 resulted in the capture of the capital of Jolo and claim 
over Sulu as a Spanish protectorate. Muslims however interpreted the resultant peace 
terms to represent merely a declaration of firm friendship between two sovereign powers. 
In spite of the treaty, the Sulu Sultan acted as independently as before. On the other 
hand Spain used the Treaty to prevent rival European powers from entering into treaties 
with Sulu. In the 1870's, the Spaniards made a more serious attempt to conquer Sulu. 
They established permanent garrisons in the island. Use of their modern navy in the 
campaign gave the Spaniards the edge to capture Jolo in 1876. The Sultan subsequently 
retired to the interior of the island. The sultan of Sulu capitulated to the Spaniards in 
1878, but Spanish control over the Moros was never complete.9 
The 'Moro Wars' had a great deal of influence on the course of Philippine 
history. The conflict caused a deep implantation of hatred and prejudices between the 
Muslim and Christian Filipinos that divided them for a long time. Although the Muslims 
were not sympathetic to the national aspirations of the Christian Filipinos in 1896-89, the 
Moro Wars was instrumental in sapping the strength of the Spanish forces.   It also 
8
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prevented the Spaniards from concentrating their forces in Luzon. This created a 
situation favorable to the formation of the Filipino revolutionary movement. The conflict 
also contributed to the cause of discontent for Christian Filipinos against Spain. In spite 
of the heavy taxes and forced labor provided by them to support the campaign against 
the Muslims, the Spaniards failed to protect Christian settlements from Muslim ravages. 
2.  Revolution of 1896 
On 26 August 1896, in the spirit of nationalism and as a protest against the abuse 
of the colonizers, Filipinos led by Andres Bonifacio revolted against Spanish colonial rule 
in Manila. The revolution proved to be the unifying event that brought about the national 
consciousness among the Filipinos.10 
General Emilio Aguinaldo took over the leadership of the Filipino insurgents on 
March 1897, when he was elected president in the convention held at Tejeros, Cavite. 
After suffering heavy losses in the fight against Spanish troops, Aguinaldo was forced 
to open armistice negotiations with the Spanish governor. An agreement was reached 
in mid-December in which the governor paid P800,000 to Aguinaldo and in return he and 
his government voluntarily went into exile. Aguinaldo chose HongKong as his place of 
exile because of its proximity to the Philippines. In time, Aguinaldo got in touch with 
Commodore George Dewey, who headed the United States Navy's Asiatic Squadron and 
tentative negotiations on possible alliances were held. 
It is interesting to note that on January 1, 1898, General Aguinaldo tried to solicit 
the participation of the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao in the fight against Spain by 
sending a proposal to them saying that he is empowered to "negotiate with the Muslims 
of Sulu and Mindanao to establish national solidarity on the basis of a real federation 
with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions."11 
10
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The proposal was the first recorded attempt of the Filipino government to deal 
with the Muslims based on absolute respect for their beliefs and traditional institutions 
without the usual Spanish undertone of eventually changing their ways of life and 
converting them to Christianity. There was no recorded reaction of the Muslims to this 
Aguinaldo proposal. 
3.   The Spanish American War 
The conflict between the United States and Spain that spun off from the U.S. 
endorsement of Cuban independence broke out into open war with the declaration of war 
by the US congress on 25 April 1898.12 The Philippines got entangled in the conflict 
when Commodore George Dewey's Asiatic Squadron attacked and destroyed the Spanish 
Fleet at Manila bay on 30 April. 
General Aguinaldo was in Singapore when war was declared. He was then 
conferring with Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, the American consul general on possible Filipino- 
American collaboration against Spain. Aguinaldo rushed to HongKong to join Dewey, 
but missed the latter who had already departed for Manila Bay. Dewey had to dispatch 
the revenue cutter 'McCulloch' to fetch Aguinaldo from HongKong, returning to the 
Philippines on 19 May 1898. Aguinaldo's arrival delighted Dewey and he gave to the 
former the arms and supplies captured from the Spaniards in Cavite. Aguinaldo 
immediately reassumed command of the rebel forces and resumed the fight against the 
Spaniards. The Filipino insurgents overwhelmed the demoralized Spanish garrisons 
around Manila.   Links were established with other movements throughout the islands.13 
Aguinaldo was led to believe by Consuls Pratt and Wildman and Admiral Dewey 
that the United States had come to liberate the Filipino people from Spanish oppression 
and that she would recognize the independence of the Philippines.   According to him, 
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America's recognition of Philippine Independence was promised in return for Filipino 
collaboration in the fight against Spain.14 
On June 12,1898, General Emilio Aguinaldo proclaimed Philippine independence 
at his headquarters in Kawit, Cavite.15 In the fight against Spain, the Filipinos believed 
their relationship with the United States was that of two allies fighting a common enemy. 
Aside from providing intelligence information on the enemy's disposition and strength, 
the Filipino troops numbering 12,000 kept the Spanish force bottled up inside Manila. 
This gave the Americans time to await the arrival of reinforcements and build up their 
strength. During this period, Aguinaldo tried to get a written commitment of support for 
Philippine Independence from the Americans but was ignored. 
When sufficient reinforcements arrived, Dewey's forces assaulted Manila on 13 
August 1898 to force the surrender of the Spaniards defending the city. Aguinaldo was 
told that his army could not participate in the operation to capture Manila and would be 
fired upon if it crossed into the city. The insurgents were infuriated at being denied 
triumphant entry into their own capital, but Aguinaldo bided his time. 
The Treaty of Paris signed on 10 December 1898, transferred sovereignty of the 
Philippines to the United States. There had been no previous US demand for annexation 
before the war. However, many Americans afflicted with expansionist fever because of 
Dewey's small victory in Manila made strong representations to take over control of the 
Philippines. Pondering over the alternatives, President McKinley later explained to 
some visiting Methodist how he arrived at his decision to annex the Philippines: 
And one night late it came to me this way-1 don't know how it was, but 
it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain- that would be 
cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France 
or Germany- our commercial rivals in the Orient- that would be bad 
business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves- 
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they were unfit for self-government- and they would soon have anarchy 
and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was 
nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, 
and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the 
very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died. 
And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly.16 
President McKinley issued a proclamation on 21 December 1898, declaring 
American policy on the Philippines to be one of "benevolent assimilation" in which "the 
mild sway of justice and right" would be substituted for "arbitrary rule". 
C.  THE AMERICAN COLONIAL PERIOD (1898-1946) 
As the head of the newly proclaimed Philippine Republic, General Emilio 
Aguinaldo protested the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippines to that of the United 
States as a result of the Treaty of Paris of 1898. In his counter-proclamation, Aguinaldo 
denounced the American action. The Americans interpreted Aguinaldo's proclamation as 
a declaration of war. The Philippine-American War followed and culminated with the 
capture of Aguinaldo at Palanan, Isabela on 23 March 1901. The Philippines again 
became a colony of a powerful nation, the United States.17 Suspicious of both Christian 
Filipinos and Americans, the Muslims in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago remained 
neutral for the most part of the Philippine-American war. 
1.   The Bates Treaty 
The Tausugs of the island of Sulu were the first group of Filipino Muslims that 
the United States authorities met upon assuming control of the Philippines. The task to 
negotiate with the Sultan of Sulu fell on the shoulders of Brigadier General John C. Bates 
of the United States Army. Bates reached an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu on 20 
August 1899. The agreement signed by Bates, the Sultan of Sulu and four of his 
principal datus became known as the "Bates Treaty."   It provided for recognition of 
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United States sovereignty in the Sulu archipelago and cooperation of the sultan and his 
datus in the suppression of piracy and apprehension of persons charged with crimes 
against non-Muslims. In return the United States pledged to respect the dignity and 
authority of the Sultan of Sulu and the other chiefs. The United States also agreed not 
to interfere with the Muslim religion. It was further agreed upon by both parties that 
there would be nonalienation of any areas in the Sulu archipelago by the United States 
without the consent of the sultan and his more important datus. The United States would 
also guarantee full protection of the sultan and his subjects in case any foreign nation 
attempted to infringe on their rights. The agreement also called for payment of the 
salaries of certain Sulu leaders from the Philippine treasury.18 
The Americans gave the first official stamp, in modern terms, to the creed of 
separatism when they signed the treaty with the Sultan of Sulu as a separate power. A 
Philippine career diplomat, Leon Maria Guerrero, summed it up without mincing words: 
American policy was seen to be one of negotiate, subjugate, separate. 
The purpose of the American colonialists to separate the two traditional 
Filipino communities was scarcely concealed.19 
The Bates Agreement however did not work well between the parties. The 
Americans thought that with the treaty, they had secured an acknowledgement of US 
sovereignty and would keep the Muslims peaceful. On the other hand, the Muslims 
believed that the treaty was an instrument that kept the Americans out of their internal 
affairs and guaranteed their way of life. The Muslims thought that the agreement was 
no better than what was imposed by the Spaniards. Unhappy over the treaty's policy of 
non-interference in Moro internal affairs, US Army authorities began to clamor for its 
abrogation.  Major General Leonard Wood saw the Bates Agreement as too lenient and 
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urged the civilian governor-general of the Philippines, William Taft, for the abrogation 
of the agreement. 
When Taft assumed the position of Secretary of War on 1 February 1904, he 
asked Wood to submit a report of violations to the agreement committed by the Datus 
and the Sultan of Sulu. Using the report as a basis, Taft authorized the new governor- 
general of the Philippines, Luke E. Wright to notify the Sultan and his datus of the 
abrogation of the Bates treaty because of their failure "to discharge the duties and fulfill 
the conditions imposed on them by said agreement." Their annuities would be forfeited 
also and they would be subject to the laws enacted for the Moro province. On 21 March 
1904, Gen. Wood notified the Sultan that the treaty was abrogated as of that date.20 
With the abrogation of the treaty, the Americans exercised direct control of 
Muslim affairs. The resulting American policy toward the Muslims resembled the 
treatment of the Indians: "treaties" made with the "savages" were not considered binding 
and could be unilaterally set aside as convenience or changes in policy demanded.21 
As the first military governor of the Moro Province, General Leonard Wood 
typified American New England Puritanical Calvinist values and Anglo-Saxon 
ethnocentrism. He found nothing in Muslim Filipino laws and customs worth preserving. 
His adoption of a hard line policy on the Moros exploded into a series of battles, 
including a struggle in 1906 where 600 Muslims died. 
2.   Thrust of American Colonial Administration 
From the start, the American colonial mission was aimed at tutelage, a process 
of preparing the Philippines for eventual independence. The civil government established 
by the Americans in 1901 started the process of preparing the Filipinos toward self- 
government. During the year, the Americans entrusted the management of the municipal 
government to the Filipinos. A year later, Filipinos assumed the management of the 
government at the provincial level.  By 1907, members of the first Philippine Assembly 
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composed of Filipinos were elected. At the outset, issues of independence and autonomy 
were the main concerns of the Assembly. 
In 1903, a Moro province was established by the American authorities and a more 
forward policy implemented: the practice of slavery was outlawed, schools that taught 
a non-Muslim curriculum were established, and local governments were organized. The 
organization of local governments directly challenged the authority of the traditional 
community leaders. A new legal system also replaced the sharia, or Islamic Law. 
United States rule, even more than that of the Spaniards, was seen as a challenge to 
Islam, a religion that prescribes not only personal beliefs but also social and political 
institutions. Armed resistance grew, and the Moro province remained under military rule 
until 1913 by which time the major Muslim groups had been subjugated.22 
3.   The Carpenter Agreement 
Frank W. Carpenter became the first civilian governor of the Moro province in 
December 1913. Governor Carpenter vigorously carried out the American policy of 
"Filipinization" of the Insular government in the Muslim area. Under his supervision, 
Filipino officials mostly Christians assumed increasingly greater responsibilities in the 
government of the Muslim region. There were efforts to integrate the Muslims into 
Philippine national life. One program encouraged settlers from the northern provinces 
to settle in Moroland and serve as example for the Muslim Filipinos. Christian Filipino 
officials labored to educate, civilize and train the Muslims in self government. 
The Muslims were powerless to stem the tide of change and their general attitude 
was of sullen acquiescence to the situation. This attitude was best exemplified by the 
"Carpenter Agreement" on 22 March 1915, which called for the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul 
Kiram n, to abdicate all his claims to temporal power in Sulu. The abdication was done 
at the insistence of Governor Carpenter. The sultan however, retained his position as the 
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titular spiritual head of the Islamic faith in the Sulu archipelago.23 
4. Land Policy 
The U.S. colonial administrators saw the vast and virtually underpopulated island 
of Mindanao as the Philippines frontier. Drawing on the geopolitical experience of the 
United States, they saw resettlement from the more densely populated northern islands 
as the pivotal means by which the Philippines could increase agricultural production, ease 
land pressure, eliminate tenancy, and reform the society. Offering the carrot of religious 
protection and respect for Muslim traditions and wielding the stick of U.S. military 
might, they subjugated the five major Muslim groups; the Maguindanaos, the Maranaos, 
the Yakans, the Samals and the Tausugs. Through legislation, based on U.S. models, 
they created a homesteading and land policy that was designed to encourage especially 
the landless peasants of the north to migrate to Mindanao. This policy was not 
aggressively challenged by the Muslims at that time because there were still excess land 
available. There was minimal effect on the Muslims because they were then practicing 
slash and burn agriculture. 
5. Muslim demand for exclusion from the Philippines 
The inclusion of the Muslim areas into what is today the Republic of the 
Philippines was the subject of a strong protest by Muslim leaders in 1935. A declaration 
was drafted and unanimously approved in a mass meeting on 18 March 1935 at Dansalan 
(now Marawi City). This was forwarded to the US Congress through the President of 
the United States.   Following are excerpts from the historic declaration: 
In the agreement that we arrived at (i.e., the Declaration) people 
gave their unanimous approval. 
We would like to inform you (i.e., the U.S. Congress) that because 
we have learned that the U.S. is going to give the Philippines 
independence through efforts of Hon. Quezon, Osmena and others, we 
want to tell you that the Philippines as it is known to the American people 
(is) populated by two different people with different religions, practices 
and traditions. The Christian Filipinos occupy the Islands of Luzon and 
23 Gowing and McAmis, Op. cit., p. 39. 
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the Visayas. The Moros predominate in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu 
(Basilan and Palawan were then regarded as part of the latter). With 
regards the forthcoming Philippine Independence, we foresee what 
condition we will be and our children when independence is granted these 
islands. This condition will (be) characterized by unrest, suffering and 
misery . . . 
Our Christian Associates have for . . . many past years shown 
their desire to be the only ones blessed with leadership and well 
progressive towns without sharing with us the advantage of having good 
towns and cities. One proof of this is that, among us who are capable of 
(participating) in managing and (administering the) government. . . have 
not been given chances to demonstrate their ability. Another proof is that 
the Christian Filipinos have taken control of our Insular funds which by 
right we must have equal share (in). Most of these funds are annually 
appropriated for Luzon and the Visayas and very little are appropriated 
for the so-called Moro provinces in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. As 
a result their provinces progress by leaps and bounds and ours (lag 
behind). Another result is that we have been and are still behind in. . . 
modern civilization and education. 
One more very discriminating act of our Christian Filipino 
Associates is shown in the recent Constitution of the Philippine 
Commonwealth. In this Constitution no provision whatsoever is made that 
would operate for the welfare of the Moros . . . The (provision of the 
) Constitution are all for the welfare of the Christian Filipinos and nothing 
for the Moros. As a proof (of) this our delegate did not sign the 
Constitution. 
We do not want to be included in the Philippine independence (for) 
once an independent nation is launched (there will be) troubles between 
us and the Christian Filipinos because from time immemorial these two 
people have not lived harmoniously ... It is not . . . proper to have 
two antagonizing people live together under one flag, under the Philippine 
independence. One proof of this (is) that when Lanao had its Filipino 
Governor many leading Moro datus were killed for no apparent reasons. 
This trouble has not yet ended up to the present time because our people 
can't and will never forget the bitterness of this incident. 
Should the American people grant the Philippines an independence, 
the islands of Mindanao and Sulu should not be included in such 
independence . . . Our public land must not be given to other people 
other than the Moros. We should be given time to acquire them because 
most of us have no land. Our people does not yet realize the value of 
acquiring lands of considerable area. We do not know also how to 
acquire those lands by the process of law. Where shall we obtain the 
support of (our) family if our lands are taken from us.  It will be safe for 
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us that a law should be created restricting the (acquisition of) our lands 
by other people.   This will also avoid future trouble. 
Our practices, laws and the decisions of our Moro leaders should 
be respected . . . Our religion should not be curtailed in any way. All 
practices which are incidents to our religion of Islam should be respected 
because these things are what a Muslim desires to live for . . . Once our 
religion is no more, our lives are no more. 
(Signed) Hadji Bogabong (Kali Sa Onayan) and over one 
hundred leading datus, Hadjis, Imams and Kalis.24 
D. JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIOD (1941-1945) 
Japanese invasion of the Philippines on 10 December 1941 cut short American 
rule and for four years the archipelago was under the Japanese occupational government. 
Anti-Japanese guerrilla activity was widespread and fierce through out the country during 
the war. A prominent guerrilla group in Central Luzon was the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon or People's Army Against the Japanese (Hukbalahap or Huks for short) whose 
membership was composed of peasants and workers. The Huks was the military arm of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines. 
In the south, prominent Muslim guerrilla leaders were Mohammad Ali Dimaporo 
and Rasid Lucman of Lanao and Salipada Pendatun from Cotabato. The Japanese were 
wary of the reputation of the Moros and they maintained a safe distance from them 
through out the period of occupation. The Allied forces under the command of General 
Douglas Mac Arthur liberated the Philippines from the Japanese in 1945. 
E. POST WORLD WAR JJ PERIOD (1945-1972) 
While nationalist movements all over Asia emerged to liberate their lands from 
vestiges of European colonial authority, there was a peaceful transfer of sovereign power 
in the Philippines. The United States kept its promise to emancipate the country. On 
4 July 1946, the Philippines was granted its independence. Thereafter, the country faced 
the challenges of a newly independent state and the difficult task of rehabilitation from 
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the ravages of the last world war. 
The country faced its first threat to national existence in 1950 when the 
Huks/peasants of the Communist Party staged a rebellion in Central Luzon. The Huks 
took up arms to protest the abuse and repression they suffered at the hands of landlords 
and government troops. The government found a champion in the then Secretary of 
National Defense and later President Ramon Magsaysay who envisioned a novel approach 
to the Huk problem. It was premised on the principle of "all out force, all-out 
friendship." At the political level, Magsaysay restored the people's faith in democracy 
by striving to have a clean and honest government. He also concentrated development 
resources to the rural areas where the roots of social injustice and discontent were found. 
A major aspect of the pacification campaign was the relocation of the members 
of the Huk movement who surrendered to resettlement areas in Mindanao. This was 
designed to undercut the communist platform of "land to the landless." Besides the 
former Huks, hundreds of thousands of Ilongos, Ilocanos and Tagalogs began settling in 
Cotabato and Lanao provinces by the 1950's. Culturally and religiously, the policy of 
resettling Christians in Mindanao became explosive. It failed to consider the change in 
the demography of the island that gradually shifted away from Muslim dominance. 
The influx of Christian Filipinos began to inflame Muslim hostility. The crux 
of the problem lay in land disputes: Christian migrants to Cotabato for example, 
complained that they bought land from one Muslim only to have his relatives refuse to 
recognize the sale and demand more money. On the other hand, Muslims claimed that 
Christians would title land through government agencies unknown to Muslim residents, 
for whom titling was a new institution. Through fraudulent legal claims, the Muslim 
residents could be evicted from their homes and land by unscrupulous settlers. The 
Bureau of Forestry also awarded vast forest areas as concession to logging firms. These 
concessions often included areas under cultivation by Muslim communities. Distrust and 
resentment spread to the public school system regarded as an agency for the propagation 
of Christian teaching. 
21 
The Muslims were gradually outnumbered because of Christian migration. 
Economic and social control of the island shifted to the hands of the Christians. The 
Muslims, an embattled minority, felt that they have lost control of their homeland and, 
like the American Indians and many other ethnic groups, thought that they have been 
savagely treated by both colonial and the postindependence national government. 
A study made in 1971 quoted 1960 figures to show that, as a direct result of 
Christian immigration, there were only two provinces left with Muslim majorities; Lanao 
del Sur and Sulu. In Cotabato and Zamboanga del Sur, Muslims had been pushed on to 
the defensive. In Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, which used to be their traditional region, 
the Muslims accounted for 23.7 % of the population. In national terms they represented 
a mere 4.8 % in a population of 39 million.25 
1.  The  Sabah Claim 
The formation of Malaysia in 1966 to include Sabah as one of its thirteen states 
led to a territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. The dispute was over 
the sultan of Sulu's claim over Sabah. The Sultan of Brunei who originally ruled over 
Sabah ceded it to the Sultan of Sulu in 1704 as a reward for helping suppress an uprising 
in his domain. In 1878, the Sultan's successor, Jamalul Azam leased the territory to 
William Cowie and Baron von Overbeck for 5,000 Malaysian dollars. Overbeck was 
then the Austrian consul at HongKong and former local manager of the British opium 
firm of Dent and Company. Whether the terms of the deal were, that Sabah was leased 
or ceded, would later become a bone of contention between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Soon after the agreement, the British North Borneo Company was formed and awarded 
a royal charter. A treaty signed in 1930 by the United States and the British Crown 
circumscribed the future territorial jurisdiction of the soon to be established Philippine 
Republic. This treaty did not include Sabah within the boundaries of Spanish, American 
or Philippine jurisdiction. Then six days after the Philippines was granted independence, 
the British North Borneo Company turned over all its rights and obligations to the British 
25 George,T. J. S., Op. Cit, p. 15. 
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government, which in turn asserted full sovereign rights over Sabah through the North 
Borneo Cessesion Order.26 
The first official Philippine act on the Sabah issue was the adoption of House 
Resolution No. 42 on April 28, 1950. It stated explicitly that North Borneo belonged 
to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. It also authorized the President to conduct negotiations 
for the restoration of sovereign jurisdiction over the territory. The Philippine 
government formally notified the United Kingdom of its claim on Sabah on June 1962. 
Talks on the issue were scheduled the following December. In the negotiations, the 
British rejected the Philippine position in view of the overriding need to form the Federal 
Republic of Malaysia, ostensibly to contain communism in Southeast Asia.27 
The claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the 
wider context of the Republic of Indonesia's "confrontation" with Malaysia and the 
Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means to crush the fledgling nation. While 
the Philippines refrained from making any open moves against Sabah, it was prepared 
to assert its claim in case the Indonesian confrontation became successful.28 Upon 
termination of the confrontation, the dispute over Sabah was brought to Bangkok, where 
bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolution were abruptly aborted. In the United 
Nation's General Assembly, the disputants exchanged contentious charges and 
countercharges.29 
When the Philippines institutionalized its claim through the enactment of Republic 
Act 5546 incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of the Philippines, the Malaysians 
suspended diplomatic ties.   Diplomatic relations were only restored on 16 December 
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1969 in time for the third ministerial conference of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations. 
2. The Jabidah Incident 
In an ill-conceived military plan in 1968, President Ferdinand E. Marcos 
organized a Filipino Muslim military group with the codename of "Jabidah," and trained 
it on Corregidor Island before infiltrating it into Sabah. When the troops learned of their 
destination and mutinied against the project, they were massacred. One soldier who 
survived the massacre, sought protection from a politician from the opposition, who later 
leaked the incident to the press. This acutely embarrassing incident prompted the 
Malaysian government to summon home its ambassador. The incident exposed Marcos 
to much criticism and ridicule in what was then still a free press.30 
3. The Muslim Independence Movement 
On 1 May 1968, former Cotabato Governor Hadji Datu Udtog Matalam 
announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement at Pagalungan, 
Cotabato. The pronouncement marked the beginning of a radical change in Muslim- 
Christian relations in Mindanao. The "Manifesto" signed by Matalam called for the 
establishment of an Islamic state. The proposed state includes all Muslim areas of the 
Southern Philippines and would be known as the "Republic of Mindanao and Sulu."31 
Probable causes for Matalam's agitation for the Muslim to secede from the 
Republic were the apparent disregard of the government over Muslim lives in the 
'Jabidah incident' and his belief that the parochial outlook of the nation did not allow the 
development of the Muslims along Islamic orientation, meaning the practice of the laws 
ordained by the Holy Koran. Matalam believed that it was not enough that the Muslims 
be allowed to practice their religious beliefs but should also be allowed to live in 
accordance with the laws laid down by Islam. He saw no possibility for this except 
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through secession. He recognized that the development of the Muslims at par with the 
rest of the nation could be accelerated with the Muslims constituting themselves into one 
nation, an Islamic state, and drawing their strength from their membership to an 
international brotherhood in Islam that transcends the boundaries of national states.32 
The "Declaration of Policy" of the Muslim Independence Movement revealed 
plainly the yearnings of the Muslims for their identity in Islam.  The declaration reads: 
That the STATE shall adhere to the Islamic ideological principle 
of social justice that those who are better off in life shall share a portion 
of his property to be determined by law to the lowly and less fortunate 
through the institution of Zakat-legal alms; 
That it shall endeavour to create a well-balanced economy, trade 
and commerce, following the Islamic ideological principle on the 
socialization of the economy in order to bring about a wider distribution 
of wealth; 
That it shall institute reforms on relations between labor and 
management in recognition of the Islamic principle that the employer has 
the obligation to share with his employees a proportionate part of his 
profits; and 
That the STATE shall recognize the generally accepted principles 
of international law and the Charter of the United Nations as part of its 
laws, in order to achieve world peace and regional cooperation.33 
Reflecting the sentiments of the Muslims, the MTM in one of its documents 
pointed out the fact that "the destiny of all Muslims in Southeast Asia is to stand together 
and fight side by side for the defense of their common religion, cultural identity, social 
institutions and national respect and honor against the forces of oppression, subversion, 
intolerance and reactionary elements which creep into the Muslim community.34 
The manifesto was given a wide distribution in the national and international 
press. At first most of Muslim Filipinos showed disinterest in the movement. The 
Christians in Cotabato, however, reacted in fear and apprehension. By June 1968 there 
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were reports of Christians fleeing from North Cotabato for fear of Muslim uprising. 
Other Christians who had firmly established themselves in productive farms and 
businesses opted to stay and prepared to defend themselves against Muslim attempts to 
drive them out. Sporadic, small scale raids and retaliation began to happen and toward 
the end of 1969, the tension and fear on opposite sides heightened. 
Young Turks of the Independence Movement dissatisfied with the political 
chicanery and corruption of the old guards began distancing themselves and rallied 
behind Nur Misuari in forming the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the late 
1960s. Misuari was a faculty member of the Asian Center at the University of the 
Philippines in Manila before he organized the MNLF. 
4.   Shooting War started in South Cotabato 
The "shooting war" between Christians and Muslims began on 22 March 1970, 
when six people were reported killed and two others wounded at Upi, South Cotabato. 
The incident was attributed to a band of tribal Tirurays under the leadership of 
"Toothpick" who was reported to be fighting against alleged Muslim terrorism and 
exploitation. The conflict spread from Upi to the province of North Cotabato where 18 
of the 34 municipalities were in various stages of conflict.35 
Following these incidents a terrorist organization of Christians called Ilagas (Rats) 
began operating in Cotabato. In response, Muslim armed bands called Blackshirts were 
formed to counter the Christian armed groups. The Ilagas started as self-defense units 
to protect Christian communities, especially settlers coming from Iloilo province. As the 
conflict dragged, the Ilagas degenerated into lawless groups. On the other hand the 
Blackshirts formed the military arm of the Muslim Independence Movement.36 
On 4 July 1971, the conflict spread to the town of Wao in Lanao del Sur. A 
grenade exploded inside a mosque and over 60 Muslim homes were alleged to have been 
burned by Ilagas. The Muslim inhabitants of Wao evacuated to the Lake Lanao area and 
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the Maranaos of Lanao del Sur vowed revenge. What followed were incidents of 
Christian houses burned and Christians ambushed. Muslim armed groups calling 
themselves "Barracudas" began fighting the Christian Ilagas. The Barracudas were 
linked with Ali Dimaporo, a Muslim congressman from the Nationalista Party. 
Outbreaks of violence appeared to have no definite pattern, rather they occurred 
spontaneously where there are large concentrations of Muslim and Christian populations 
in the same area. This resulted in the closing of schools in the areas where armed 
confrontation occur. Mass evacuations of innocent victims became a common sight. The 
sad thing about the situation was Philippine army troops sent in to restore law and order 
were accused by the Muslims of siding with the Christians.37 
In August, 1971, armed confrontation occurred in the town of Buldon in the 
province of North Cotabato. This time the battle was between Muslim Blackshirts and 
Philippine Constabulary troopers. Local and foreign leaders began to accuse the 
government forces of trying to annihilate the Muslims. To diffuse the explosive 
situation, the President sent in a team of negotiators to arrange a cease-fire and forge a 
peace pact between opposing parties. The team included a Muslim senator and the 
Secretary of National Defense. The resultant peace arrangement led to the surrender of 
a few unlicensed weapons and the town receiving P 75,000 for rehabilitation projects. 
This settled the problem of Buldon.38 
On 26 October, trouble erupted in Lanao del Norte with the ambush of a 22-man 
Philippine Constabulary patrol in the town of Magsaysay. Only five government troopers 
survived the ambush. The following day, newspapers reported that 66 Muslims were 
killed in battle in Magsaysay. The President stopped the military from continuing 
"search and destroy" operations in Lanao del Norte and del Sur while he consulted with 
political, military, civic and religious leaders of the two Lanao provinces. After the 
meeting, he ordered the conduct of military operations against all lawless elements 
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whether they were Ilagas or Barracudas. He also appointed a liaison committee 
composed of respected local leaders to work with the military in seeking a lasting peace 
in Lanao. 
The election day tragedy of November 1971 in Barrio Tacub, Kauswagan, Lanao 
del Norte shocked the entire nation and won sympathy for the Muslims. Government 
troops manning a checkpoint fired upon a group of apparently unarmed Muslims, 
returning in several trucks from the special election in Magsaysay town. The incident 
which resulted in the death of at least 40 Muslims with no fatality on the government side 
was dubbed the "Tacub Massacre." Twenty one army soldiers including three officers 
were brought to trial as a result of investigations conducted by the National Bureau of 
Investigations. Later, the 21 soldiers plus three civilians, one of them a Christian 
mayor, were named respondents in a case of multiple homicide filed with the Provincial 
Fiscal of Lanao del Norte. 
Muslim Senator Mamintal Tamano earlier warned that a bloodbath in Mindanao 
was inevitable unless the national government paid more attention to the needs of the 
cultural minorities. He said that for as long as political "warlords" existed and the 
neglect of cultural minorities continues, the situation in Lanao and Cotabato will 
deteriorate.39 The arrival in mid-January 1972 of eight Muslim ambassadors to see for 
themselves the situation in the south manifested the growing international concern over 
the conflict in Mindanao. The ambassadors came from Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Singapore, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. They were later convinced, after 
visiting various Muslim areas, that there was no genocide against Filipino Muslims.40 
Reports of renewed fighting occurred in May 1972. A feud between local 
politicians and a logging company in Balabagan in the southeastern corner of Lanao del 
Sur broke down into armed conflict.   The new fighting occurred in an area of mixed 
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Muslim and Christian population. Zamboanga del Sur and Sulu also came into the 
picture as the scenes of new conflict. Reports began to circulate on the existence of 
Muslim "training camps" using "Malay speaking" foreign instructors in Sulu. Further, 
a "feud" between Iligan City and Marawi City in Lanao del Norte contributed to the 
escalation of fears and tensions in both areas. In all these hot spots, evacuations of both 
Muslims and Christians continued, resulting in economic dislocation, heightened 
resentment between Muslims and Christians, and widened the rift between them. 
5.  Declaration of Martial Law 
In 1972, the country continued to suffer from a severe law and order problem that 
saw the proliferation of private armies and unlicensed firearms, frequent staging of rallies 
by left wing students, rise in crime rate and a spreading conflict in the southern islands. 
President Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed Martial Law on 21 September 1972 to check 
these problems. The proclamation practically abrogated the 1935 Constitution and 
provided full powers to Marcos. Besides centralizing power, Martial law consolidated 
it in the hands of Christians namely: Marcos, his family, his cronies, technocrats and 
the military. Martial law also restricted the range of legitimate political activity, giving 
the people only two options: either to accept the Marcos regime or conduct revolutionary 
activities against the regime. For a short period, Martial Law resulted in an 
improvement in the law and order situation in the country, including the hot spots in 
Mindanao.41 
Apparently the Martial Law policy of collecting loose firearms ran into stiff 
resistance from the Muslims who equated arms possession with their distinct culture. 
They were concerned that the confiscation of their weapons would leave them 
dangerously exposed to their Christian and military enemies. They felt that the political 
developments in Manila were threatening their existence and the fear of vulnerability 
and resumption of violence left them with few choices.   Full scale war broke out one 
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month after the declaration of martial law.42 
Violence started in Marawi City in Lanao on October 21, 1972. Fanatical 
Muslim rebel forces numbering from 500 to 1,000 made simultaneous attacks on the 
Mindanao State University, the provincial headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary 
at Camp Amai Pakpak and the Pantar bridge at the boundary of the two Lanao provinces. 
This was the first time that the rebels fought under the banner of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF). The rebels gained control of the PBS radio station in the 
University campus and broadcast inflammatory propaganda urging the Muslim Maranaos 
to support their cause. The people of Marawi did not heed their call. Failing to get the 
people's support, the rebels easily crumbled to the operation of the government troops 
to reestablish control over the city. However, before they left, the rebels looted the 
homes of Christians and took several as hostage whom they later killed.43 The attack 
on a Philippine Constabulary outpost in the town of Parang, Cotabato followed the 
Marawi incident. Flare up all over Western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago 
followed. 
In November 1972, Muslim rebels landed considerable quantities of arms in Jolo 
and the Tawi-Tawi group to the south. In late December, a full scale attack was 
launched in those islands. By January 1973, the rebels were in control of about 80% of 
the island of Basilan. There were also incidents of violence in some smaller islands of 
the Sulu archipelago. When the Armed Forces had almost contained the situation in the 
islands, another front opened in the province of Cotabato. For two weeks the security 
forces were hit by a series of concerted guerilla attacks. The attack abated only when 
enough troops were mustered to rush in and storm the towns and strongholds occupied 
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by the rebels.44 In April 1973, violence erupted in Davao province where there had 
been no trouble before. Rebel forces stormed the city of Jolo in February 1974 and held 
it for two days before government forces could regain control. The rebels left a large 
part of Jolo destroyed by fire, which brought economic misery to the Muslim population. 
Although the conflict in the south in the 1960s started from land disputes between 
the Muslims and Christian settlers, animosity between the two groups had its origins 
during the Spanish colonial period when people from Luzon and Visayas were subjugated 
and converted to Christianity and later made to fight the Moros who resisted Spanish 
rule. Relations between the two groups did not improve during the American colonial 
period. The Muslims were separately administered because of continued Muslim 
resistance to American rule. This effectively cut them off from the mainstream of 
Philippine society. A land policy encouraging people from Luzon and Visayas to migrate 
to Mindanao started the influx of Christians into the Muslim areas. This policy 
continued to be implemented even after the attainment of independence in 1946. A major 
aspect of the governments solution to the communist rebellion in the 1950s was the 
awarding of land to rebel surrenderees in resettlement areas in Mindanao. The Muslims 
were alarmed by the unfavorable demographic change. They tried to regain political and 
economic control in the traditional Muslim areas, however the Christian settlers who had 
already established themselves resisted. After both groups started arming themselves, 
armed confrontation became inevitable. What started out as isolated armed confrontations 
between Muslims and Christians transformed into a full blown war as the Muslims tried 
to secede from the country. How the Moro National Liberation Front became the lead 
Muslim secessionist organization is the subject of discussion in the following chapter. 
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m. THE MUSLIM SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT 
Mass outrage over the 1968 Jabidah massacre in Corregidor where several 
Muslim military recruits were supposedly executed by their Christian military superiors, 
had a galvanizing effect on the various grievances of the Muslims. The indignation over 
the perceived low regard for the life of Muslims by the government fueled the 
frustrations of people from the whole spectrum of the Filipino Muslim community, giving 
birth to the idea of separatism. 
Incensed over the Jabidah massacre and disgusted over government's neglect of 
the welfare of Muslim Filipinos, Hadji Datu Udtog Matalam, the former governor of 
Cotabato province, organized the Muslim Independence Movement and formally launched 
it on 1 May 1968. The MEM became the first Muslim organization that publicly broached 
the idea of a separate Filipino Muslim nation. 
People from various Muslim sectors joined the Movement. Farmers displaced by 
Christian settlers saw in the movement an opportunity to get back their lands. Victims 
of army and police abuses saw it as an instrument of exacting revenge. To religious 
leaders, the movement was a means of building a theocratic Islamic state. Disgruntled 
politicians and people who aimed for public office found the movement an excellent 
vehicle to launch successful careers. Students and intellectuals were moved by their 
social duty while adventurous and impatient youngsters wanted to test their fighting 
prowess. Others simply joined because their friends and relatives were in the 
movement. Although Matalam was a well-respected leader, he was already an old man 
when he organized the MIM. He and the other traditional leaders of the Movement were 
too infirm and conservative to fire and energize the Muslims. Failure of the traditional 
leaders to exploit the spirit of the movement moved the younger Muslims to take the 
cudgel and rally the Muslims into a united and more aggressive force. 
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A. THE RISE OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THE 1960s 
The worldwide phenomenon of student activism and the influence of the cultural 
revolution in China reached and made considerable influence on the Philippines in the 
mid 1960s. Marxist inspired students and workers conducted radical protest activities 
that became a frequent occurrence in the streets of Manila. Muslim students studying 
there were caught up in them, raising their political, economic and social awareness. 
Worldwide resurgence of Islam also occurred during this period and contacts made by 
the Filipino Muslim students with the international Islamic community added to their 
political maturity. The student protest activities in Manila against the Marcos regime 
gradually influenced the thinking of Muslim students. Their focus of discontent shifted 
from the Christian sector of the Filipino society to that of the administration of President 
Marcos itself. The perception that the government was siding with the Christians in the 
simmering Muslim-Christian conflict, and the failure to resolve the growing social, 
economic and political problems that caused earlier clashes between rival armed gangs 
of Christian and Muslim communities, further reinforced the discontent against the 
Marcos government. Moving a step down the political structure, the Muslim students 
and intellectuals were also disenchanted with the political dishonesty and corruption of 
the traditional Muslim leaders, the datus and the traditional politicians. Many of these 
young Muslim students and intellectuals became Marxist-inspired and formed their own 
clandestine group to initiate change. Nur Misuari provided the leadership for the young 
Muslims. Misuari is a Muslim idealist who until June 1972 was a faculty member of the 
Asian Center at the University of the Philippines in Manila.45 
B. THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM 
The resurgence of Islam flows from a regained self-confidence by countries in the 
Middle East. This was a result of the material wealth derived from oil resources that 
these countries have been blessed with.  The main thrust of the Muslim revival centered 
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on Islam as a focus of identity, a universal faith-culture that encompasses two continents 
and brought together 600 million followers. The mounting tide of Islam coincided with 
the Third World state of mind of admiration/hatred of the West and of disillusionment 
with modernization. Revival of an international Islamic identity as an alternative to other 
blocs and groupings throughout the world and a domestic Muslim revival to influence 
national policies are two developments that can be identified with the rise of Islam. 
The international gathering of Muslim leaders in Rabat in 1969, initiated by King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia gave impetus to the revival of Islam. The meeting of the leaders 
caused the formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The summit 
conference in 1969 had a widespread impact on the Islamic world at large. The media 
carried news and pictures of Muslim leaders embracing each other in disregard of their 
traditional rifts and jealousies, giving the impression of a truly universal Muslim 
brotherhood.46 
Following the Rabat conference, Muammar Qaddafi, the young, visionary, fanatic 
and imaginative leader of a military coup succeeded in his bid for power in Libya. 
Catapulted to international prominence, Qaddafi emphasized the trend towards the 
predominance of Islam in domestic and international policies of Islamic nations. 
Qaddafi's Islamic neo-puritanism at home, coupled with his aggressive religious zeal 
abroad, made him a very important political figure, especially as his power was backed 
with large oil resources. Moreover, he saw himself as the arbiter of all the Islamic 
countries.  He encouraged believers to return to the strict standards of early Islam.47 
Qaddafi's anti-colonial stance led him to support dissident or revolutionary 
movements, particularly Muslim movements, that were fighting established reactionary 
regimes. Support comes in the form of weapons, funds and training. He was also 
believed to have supported the training and equipment requirements of terrorist groups 
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like the Palestinians and the Irish Republican Army. 
In the Philippines, Islamic resurgence has taken strongest root in the proliferation 
of Islamic schools known as madrasah. In the past there were few sources of instruction 
in Islamic traditions. With the resurgence of Islam, mosques were built in every 
barangay, and every mosque had its madrasah. Most of the madrasah supplemented 
rather than replaced conventional Western education, with students attending on the 
weekends to study Arabic, Islamic history and law, the Koran and ethics. The madrasahs 
contributed to the Filipino Muslims awareness towards the Islamic faith. Muslim elites 
emerged seeking autonomy and the right to apply Islamic values to the traditional Muslim 
areas in the south. There was also a growing desire to identify themselves with the 
wider Muslim umma or worldwide Islamic community. 
C.  BIRTH OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
It was initially under the auspices of the Mindanao Independence Movement that 
Muslim rebels were sent to Malaysia to undergo military training starting in 1969. The 
rebels received training in guerilla warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, 
demolition, automatic firing and jungle survival from Malaysian officers. Most of the 
early trainees were Marxists inspired Muslim students who became disillusioned with the 
traditional Muslim leadership and organization. They saw the need to form a more 
aggressive organization to effect change. 
It was in one of the training sites in Pulau Pangkor, an island off the coast of 
West Malaysia's Perak state, that the Moro National Liberation Front was formed in 
1969. Its avowed objective is to form a separate state called the Bangsa Moro Republik 
(BMR), comprising the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.48 
The MNLF is an expression of Muslim opposition to the government land policy 
in the south perceived as an enforced Christianization of Moroland. It was also a 
response to the steady erosion  of Muslim political power and to the economic 
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discrimination suffered in the hands of the local Christian sector. 
The core of MNLF leaders came from five principal batches of Pulau Pangkor 
trainees between 1969 and 1970. The lower ranking members of the organization 
received training in camps in Sabah. The rebels came from basically three groups: 
Maguindanaos in Cotabato, Maranaos in the two Lanao provinces, and the Tausogs in 
Sulu, Basilan and the coastal areas of Zamboanga del Sur. Recruits are given six months 
of military training and political education before they join the regular field units.49 
The MNLF has parallel political and military structures. The political arm consists 
of a central committee of twenty members, a political bureau, a propaganda and 
intelligence bureau, and provincial and barrio committees. The political organization was 
a coalition of traditional and conservative Muslim elite and the Marxist inspired young 
radicals. Through the organization, the traditional elites got a vehicle to maintain political 
power, while the young radicals gained legitimation from the credentials of the 
former.50 The Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) provided the military arm of the 
organization. It is headed by a field-marshal who is under the central committee but not 
directly supervised by it. There are also field-marshals at the provincial level and zone 
commanders at the municipality level.51 
D. FOREIGN SUPPORT TO THE REBELS 
The rebels started receiving foreign monetary aid as early as 1969. Funds were 
initial given to the MEM through the older Muslim leaders like former Congressman 
Rascid Lucman. While openly under the MEM, Nur Misuari covertly built up his own 
organization.   He used the money he received to finance the formation of the Bangsa 
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Moro Army that later became the military arm of the MNLF. When the MIM leadership 
found that he was operating not under the auspices of the MIM but as MNLF Chairman, 
a split in the relationship followed and monetary support to the latter was cut off. 52 
Misuari sent representatives to Malaysia to convince the Malaysians of the 
legitimacy of the objectives of the MNLF and to resume monetary support directly to 
his organization. Two sets of delegations sent to Malaysia produced negative results. 
The Malaysians wanted Misuari to patch up his differences with Lucman and the older 
Muslim leaders. They also wanted him to go to Sabah and explain what happened. 
After two trips, Misuari convinced the Malaysians that his organization represented a 
united front against the government.   Aid to the rebels resumed after that. 
Lucman at first tried to reestablish control over the secessionist movement, calling 
for an independent Islamic state and denigrating the communist character of Misuari's 
MNLF, the Bangsa Moro Army (Moro People's Army) and the goal of establishing a 
Moro People's Republik. Failing to wrest back the rebel movement from Misuari, 
Lucman laid down his arms and got an amnesty from President Marcos.53 
The man responsible for Malaysian support to the Filipino Muslim rebels was Tun 
Datu Haji Mustapha, the Chief Minister of Sabah. He was born in Sulu and had several 
relatives in elective positions there. He was also a guerilla fighter in Jolo during the 
Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War Two.54 Mustapha earned the 
friendship of most of the Muslim rulers in the Middle East, most especially King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi by his demonstrated religious zeal 
in converting the natives and the Chinese in Sabah to Islam. As Secretary General of the 
OIC he endorsed the Moro case submitted to him in 1972 and asked King Faisal and 
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President Qaddafi to help persuade other OIC member states to support it.55 
Mustapha provided aid to the rebels and allowed the use of Sabah as training 
camp, supply depot, communication center and sanctuary. He let the rebels acquire 
motor boats in Sabah for smuggling of arms and ammunition to their forces in Mindanao 
and for bringing back rebel casualties for treatment in Sabah. He supplied the rebels 
with arms and money, either on his own or as a conduit for Colonel Qaddafi. Mustapha 
believed that by helping the Muslims in the Southern Philippines, he was helping his 
people. Many Muslims however believed that he decided to support the rebels only after 
the Philippines laid formal claim to Sabah in the early 1960s, an act that led the two 
countries to break diplomatic relations twice.56 
The Malaysian Government in Kuala Lumpur strenuously denied that it was 
supporting the Muslim rebels. Not wanting to alienate Malaysia, the Philippine 
government accepted the assurance of the Malaysian Government. However, Kuala 
Lumpur may not have the full control over the activities of Tun Mustapha at that time. 
Evidence has subsequently been quoted to suggest that he had ambitions for a state of his 
own whose nucleus would be Sabah, Sulu and Mindanao. There may be some truth to 
this because Sabah's relationship with Malaysia was up for review in 1973.57 
Libya supplied money and arms to the rebels in the belief that the Philippine 
Government had embarked on a programme of genocide. The Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi was said to have decided to intervene in the south after hearing a radio program 
on Muslim problems there. He ordered arms and money to be supplied after asking his 
aides: "Where exactly is Cotabato?" In 1972, Misuari and several established Muslim 
politicians of the south visited Libya to arrange the flow of support to the rebels. 
Representations made to channel arms and funds through Sulawesi or Kalimantan were 
rejected by the Indonesian government.  This left Sabah as the only conduit for foreign 
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aid from the Middle East.58 
The first shipment of firearms from Sabah landed in December 1972 at the town 
of Lebak in Cotabato province. Boats, each powered with three Volvo-Penta 170 
engines, brought in Belgian made Cal 7.62 rifles, anti-personnel mines, grenades of the 
cylindrical unserrated type, plastic explosives, Cal 30 LMG, Browning carbines, Cal 30 
Mis and several thousand rounds of ammunition to Cotabato and other landing sites 
regularly for the next fourteen months.59 
In contrast to the Libyan zeal, Southeast Asian governments maintained a low 
profile with regards to the Mindanao crisis. There were deep concerns in Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur that, just when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was 
making some headway in different but important areas, it seems to have fallen into the 
old destructive rut. Both governments maintained that the crisis was an internal affair 
of the Philippines. 
E.  MNLF LEADERSHIP 
According to one account, the original five members of the MNLF were Nur 
Misuari, Abul Khayr Alonto, Indar Tampi, Amelil Malaquiok (Commander Ronnie), and 
another Muslim from Zamboanga- two Tausug/Samal, two Maranao, and one 
Maguindanaoan. On the other hand Jamil Lucman claimed that there were ten founders 
of the MNLF. He identified the founders as: Nur Misuari, Jamail Lucman, Abul Khayr 
Alonto, Amelil Malaquiok, Al Bandaing, Sali Wali, Utu Salajuddin, Ali Boon, Abdul 
Manan, and Akman Inampala.  The last four had already been killed.60 
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The recognized leader and chairman of the central committee is Nur Misuari. He 
is a Tausug from the Sulu archipelago. He was a prominent member of the Kabataan 
Makabavan (Nationalist Youth) founded by Jose Maria Sison in 1964. The Kabataan 
Makabayan was a Marxist-inspired organization that draw membership from students and 
ideologues. Sison went on to form the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on 26 
December 1968, and this served as a model for Misuari in organizing the MNLF. 
Misuari and his wife, Desdemona Tan, who was from a prominent Chinese family in 
Sulu, were based in the Middle East. 
The vice-chairman, who remained in Mindanao, was Abul Khayr Alonto. He is 
a member of a prominent Lanao Maranao family. He was a former law student at San 
Beda College in Manila and won the vice-mayorship of Marawi City in the 1971 
elections. Abhoud Syed Lingga served as the Front's spokesman to journalists when he 
chaired the political secretariat in northern Mindanao. He was later removed from 
office. Hashim Salamat, a Maguindanao, chaired the foreign affair's committee and 
served as the Front's spokesman abroad. Abdulhamid Lukman, a former municipal 
judge at Maimbung, Sulu, served as Salamat's deputy until he defected in August 1975. 
Abdul Baki, a Tausug living in the Middle East, also served as spokesman of the 
Front.61 
The MNLF leadership tried to develop an ideology that gave emphasis to "Moro" 
nationalism and social reform to obtain both foreign Islamic support and the support of 
the local Muslim community. It is this objective expressed in Marxist phraseology that 
led to the early falling out between the young intellectual leadership of the MNLF and 
traditional Muslim leaders. 
F.   THE DOMESTIC FRONT 
At the outset, the MNLF had to form its own fighting units in the provinces of 
Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, and Sulu, 
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independent of the other rebel groups. They had to show that their units were better 
organized, disciplined and dedicated than the other groups. These attributes did not pass 
unnoticed so when the MNLF sounded off a call for unity, many decided to join. Other 
rebel groups joined the MNLF but retained their own independent identity. The rebel 
movement grew in size under the leadership of the MNLF. It turned out to be a more 
disciplined successor to the Mindanao Independence Movement. Through its military 
arm, the Bangsa Moro Army, rebellion began within a month after the declaration of 
'martial law'. The rebels waged a furious war against central authority and during the 
next year the Armed Forces of the Philippines had to struggle desperately to restore 
control. 
The uprising was not connected with the imposition of Martial law in September 
1972. However, rebel propaganda tried to portray Martial law as a government tool to 
forcibly integrate and Christianize the Muslims. Their own propaganda aroused their 
fighting spirit.   The rebels rallied the Muslims to their cause by  declaring "jihad." 
The rebels used classic guerilla tactics of encircling the urban centers and isolating 
them from the other areas by cutting and controlling the roads. They made good use of 
ambush and withdrawal and of surprise and mobility. Unlike the army, their intelligence 
is good. Their targets are visible while they are not. They have a vital underground 
supplementary force in their sympathizers, whom the Armed Forces cannot isolate. They 
knew the terrain and exploited it to their strategic advantage. What distinguishes the war 
from previous small scale encounters between dissidents and the constabulary was that 
for the first time it seemed relatively organized. The rebels had communication 
equipment and there was a unified command, at least in each area.62 
1.   The Grand Design to Independence 
The Cotabato operation of the MNLF was the pivotal point for the rebellion. The 
rebel planned to use Cotabato as the main logistical base for foreign support.   This 
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initially required clearing the province of government forces. The Cotabato Command 
would later link up with the Davao Command and drive through the Agusan corridor to 
the Surigao provinces in the east. Meanwhile, a task force from the Cotabato Command 
would push toward Bukidnon while the Lanao Command will push toward Misamis 
Oriental. Zamboanga MNLF command would take over Misamis Occidental, while 
Basilan/Jolo MNLF would take over the whole of the Sulu archipelago to include the 
province of Palawan.63 
Datu Ali Sansaluna was the leader of 5000-6000 men that composed the 
MNLF Cotabato Command. Two thousand of his men were armed with powerful 
weapons of European make. The rebels selected Lebak as their logistical base because 
of the advantages of terrain. The coastline and the Tran and Tran Peidu rivers provided 
excellent entry points for the landing of arms and ammunition and other war material 
coming from abroad. Tran river provided the natural obstacle to any planned enemy 
incursion into the fortified area. The sea provided an easy avenue of withdrawal. From 
Lebak, the MNLF distributed war material that arrived from abroad, to units in the 
central plains of Cotabato.64 
The encounter between the MNLF Cotabato Command and a Philippine 
Constabulary patrol on 27 February 1973, signaled the offensive against AFP 
detachments all over Cotabato. The Cotabato Command easily neutralized government 
forces in the central plains of Cotabato. Land traffic from Cotabato City to Davao City, 
General Santos City and to Parang where the command center of the Fourth Philippine 
Constabulary Zone headquarters was located, was cut off by the rebels. This severely 
affected the security and economic situation in the area. The rebels aimed to capture the 
Cotabato City-Awang Airport complex as the last phase of the Cotabato operations before 
moving on to the next stage of their plan. 
63
 Abat, Fortunate, The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao, SB A Printers Inc, Quezon 
City,  p. xx. 
64
 Ibid., p. xx. 
43 
Facing the rebel onslaught were the 27th Infantry Battalion of the 
Philippine Army, the 54th Philippine Constabulary Battalion and the PC Provincial 
Commands. After the blitz-like operations of the MNLF in the province of Cotabato, 
the rebels occupied/controlled/ influenced the towns of Tumbao, Datu Piang, Buluan, 
Sultan sa Barongis, Ampatuan, a part of Columbio, Maganoy except its poblacion, 
Dinaig, a large part of Nuling, Upi and Lebak except for a foothold in the shoreline 
compound of the Magsaysay Logging Company. Cotabato City and the Awang airport 
complex were practically surrounded by MNLF occupied/controlled/influenced areas.65 
The rebels intensified the ambush of military convoys and attacks on 
isolated communities and inadequately defended government outposts and bridge 
defenses. They are by this time able to mount attacks up to battalion in size. The 
MNLF leadership assumed that the Marcos government can only be forced to make 
significant concessions by a combination of a war of attrition and diplomatic pressure. 
The Bangsa Moro Army however, committed the mistake of trying to 
hold-territory against the government forces who had superior fire power and logistics 
back-up. As a result of a flawed strategy, the rebels suffered major losses. Thereafter, 
the rebels changed their strategy in favor of guerilla warfare and 'mass work'. Rebel 
activity fell into a pattern where escalation of the armed conflict normally precedes the 
meetings of the Organization of Islamic Conference. In between conferences of the OIC, 
rebel initiated armed conflict tend to subside. 
G.    THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT 
By the first quarter of 1974, the MNLF succeeded in getting the attention of the 
Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers. As a result, MNLF representatives were 
invited to attend the Kuala Lumpur summit in June 1974. Two documents presented by 
the rebel delegation to the Conference, asked for recognition and support in their struggle 
65 Ibid., p. 47. 
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for an independent Muslim state in Southern Philippines.66 
The rebels were not able to get what they wanted for the foreign ministers' in 
their communique called for "a political and peaceful solution . . . within the framework 
of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines." What the rebels 
gained in the conference was the specific recognition of the MNLF as the representative 
of Muslim Filipinos. It also got an explicit description of the socioeconomic plan of the 
Philippine government to address the problem in the south which it found inadequate.67 
The MNLF embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to gain international 
recognition to its cause. In particular, it targeted the influential Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) for its campaign for recognition. It made a bid for full membership 
in the body. When the MNLF first submitted its application, the OIC turned it down. 
In succeeding conferences of the OIC, the MNLF continued to apply for permanent 
membership, and every time, the conferees failed to consider the application. Apparently 
the OIC is wary that this would set a precedent for other Muslim secessionist movements 
in other countries. Although the MNLF has not achieved membership in the OIC, it has 
gained the support of the Organization into mediating into the conflict. The involvement 
of the OIC has prevented the Philippine Government from using an all out military 
solution to solve the problem in the south. 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER SECESSIONIST EFFORT 
A.    THE MARCOS REGIME 
1.  Military Action 
The Government's initial response to the escalating conflict during the first 
quarter of 1973 was to put more troops into the troubled area. By the first week of 
March 1973, the situation became very serious to require Presidential action. President 
Marcos designated Brigadier General Fortunato Abat as head of the newly formed 
Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM). Abat was then the Commanding General of 
the Third Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Camp Lapu-lapu, Cebu City. Marcos' orders 
to General Abat were: 
I am sending a plane right now to bring you to Cotabato. You shall take 
command of all units and military personnel (there) ... I have directed 
the Chief of Staff to send you reinforcements . . . Study the situation 
carefully, plan well. Any thing that you need, don't hesitate to call me 
up.   ... I want you to report to me directly and as often as you can.   . 
68 
a.   Campaign to reestablish control in Cotabato 
General Abat assumed operational control of all military and paramilitary 
forces in the provinces of Cotabato, South Cotabato and Davao del Sur effective 6 March 
1973. The initial phase of the CEMCOM Campaign plan was to consolidate existing 
forces and buildup troops and resources. An essential part of this phase was the clearing 
of the Parang-Cotabato City road, and sanitizing the Cotabato-Awang complex and using 
it as the main base of operations. The second phase was the offensive phase aimed at 
the destruction of rebel forces. This called for securing the foothold in Lebak and the 
air-head in beleaguered Maganoy as future bases of operations. It also called for the 
consolidation of other areas not under rebel control.   An essential part of the plan was 
68 Abat, Fortunato., Op. Cit., p. 13. 
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to strengthen the Civilian Home Defense Forces. This was to enable the people to secure 
their respective communities and free AFP units for operations against the main rebel 
forces. The third phase was the reestablishment of civil authority. This called for the 
appointment of local officials, reintroduction of government agencies, reopening of 
schools, and strengthening of police forces. A fourth phase of the campaign plan was 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase. The fifth and final phase was the 
reconciliation phase. An intensive psychological operations directed towards the people 
to forget the hatred, animosity and bitterness caused by the conflict will be conducted by 
the government.69 
CEMCOM first secured the Cotabato City-Awang airport complex from 
rebel attack, then it sanitized the surrounding areas in preparation for the launching of 
the offensive. The 6th Infantry Brigade was formed out of the reinforcement units that 
arrived in Cotabato City and designated the major tactical command of CEMCOM. 
The offensive started with the reopening of the 20-kilometer line of communications 
between Cotabato City and Parang. Operations started on 10 March 1973 and ended on 
21 March 1973 when the road was secured and opened to traffic. The Dinaig operations 
followed on 27 March and ended with the capture of the town on the 29th. The next 
objective was Datu Piang. It was the seat of control of the rebel held and influenced 
areas of the central plain of Cotabato. Datu Piang was where the MNLF Cotabato 
Command planned to launch the final assault on the Cotabato City-Awang Complex. 
Prior to the offensive, the government airdropped thousands of psychological leaflets 
over the town of Datu Piang calling for the residents to convince the rebels to leave the 
town within 24 hours and save it from death and destruction. The leaflets also warned 
the residents to evacuate the town proper or stay under strong structures and protect 
themselves from the bombardment that would take place after the 24-hour deadline. 
They were instructed to come out with white flags when they saw the advancing 
CEMCOM troops.  Other psy-war leaflets urged the rebels to surrender with assurances 
69 Ibid., p. 47. 
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of safe conduct passage, humanitarian treatment and government assistance. The leaflets 
created the desired result. The rebels departed the town before the 24-hour deadline. 
The 12th Infantry Battalion occupied Datu Piang on 5 April 1973 without firing a shot. 
The Central plain offensive ended with the occupation of Pagalungan on 8 May 1973.70 
In its operations, CEMCOM tried to seek the help of traditional leaders 
in regaining peace in the area. An example was when military operations were about to 
start to regain control of the town of Pagalungan. Datu Udtog Matalam, the moving 
spirit of the Mindanao Independence Movement was from this place and General Abat 
thought it wise to enlist his help in bringing peace to the area. CEMCOM lifted its 
orders on resources and population control on Pagalungan when Datu Matalam agreed 
to talk with General Abat. The President also went out of his way to convince Matalam 
to help the government by talking to him over the telephone. After the dialogue a 
massive civic action program was conducted in Pagalungan. The following government 
agencies participated in the civic action: the Philippine National Red Cross, SPARE 
(Special Programme of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees), Social Welfare, 
Health, Agriculture departments and the National Grains Authority. Government effort 
to get the support of Matalam paid off. Pagalungan returned to government control with 
minimal military effort on 8 May 1973. 
b.   The MNLF Diversionary Action in Davao 
MNLF rebels attacked and occupied the coastal town of Tarragona in 
Davao Oriental on 22 April 1973, to relieve pressure on Cotabato. The rebels later 
moved toward the town of Mati and threatened the provincial capital. Constabulary 
provincial command, police elements and Civilian Home Defense Forces put up a 
courageous defense against the rebels. The 6th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army 
was tasked to retake Tarragona on 1 May. The town was recaptured on 7 May 1973. 
Mopping up operations by the Army followed and ended on 25 August when Davao 
70 Ibid., pp. 60-67. 
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Oriental Philippine Constabulary reassumed responsibility for law and order.71 
c. Military Operations Against Datu Guiwan 
Datu Guiwan Mastura held sway over the Muslim population in the three 
towns of Lebak, Kalamansig and Palimbang. Guiwan is a direct descendant of Sultan 
Kudarat of the Sultanate of Maguindanao. His rebel group was deployed to the east and 
south of the town of Lebak. Military operation against Guiwan was launched on 21 
March 1973 with the opening of the road between Lebak and Kalamansig. This forced 
Guiwan to withdraw to the eastern hills of Lebak and Kalamansig and southward to the 
Muslim town of Palimbang. Military units pursued Datu Guiwan and his force to 
Palimbang where they caught up with him on 17 April 1973. He was forced to surrender 
with nearly a thousand people composed of able-bodied fighters, their wives and 
children. 
d. The Tran Operations 
Tran was the hardest fought piece of real estate in Central Mindanao. This 
was the main logistics base of the MNLF's Cotabato Command. The deep waters of 
Linao Bay and the wide mouths of its rivers made possible the use of Volvo Penta speed 
boats and Kumpits to bring in arms, ammunition and other war material to the rebels. 
Tran was heavily fortified with bunkers, trenches, air-raid shelters and land mines. It 
was guarded by 600 rebels under Datu Sangki Karon, a former councilman of Lebak.72 
Military operations against the rebels started on 6 June 1973. Government 
forces included the 21st, the 22nd and the 4th Infantry Battalions PA, the 1st Composite 
Infantry Battalion, GHQ, the 554th and 531st Philippine Constabulary Companies and 
four ships of the Naval task Group 71.1. The well-entrenched rebels put up heavy 
resistance forcing CEMCOM to deploy more troops in the Tran area. As the 
government forces kept tightening the noose, pushing the rebels to the octopus head of 
the Tran river in Turogan, the density of anti personnel mines increased, causing many 
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casualties. Surrender leaflets addressed to the combatants and non-combatants were 
dropped into the area. When military commanders learned of the presence of women and 
children in the area, they suspended offensive operations. There were rebel attempts to 
break out from the government cordon and most of these were pushed back into the 
cordon. A few attempts succeeded by taking advantage of the dark hours and using the 
Tran River as escape route to Linao Bay.73 
After almost two months of fighting, the rebels could no longer withstand 
the pressure of the government onslaught. On 3 August 1973, a thousand rebels and 
their families surrendered to the government forces. After gathering them at the mouth 
of the Tran River, Navy boats sealifted them to Cotabato City for processing. The Red 
Cross, Social Welfare and Health agencies of the government together with civic 
organizations were organized to assist the surrenderees. 
There were some hold outs among the rebels so mopping up operations 
were conducted until the 6th of August. The operation resulted in 46 military and 6 
Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF) killed in action, and 167 military and 13 CHDF 
wounded.   On the rebel side, 137 were killed and 981 surrendered.74 
e.   Other Central Mindanao Operations 
Rebel concentration in Reina Regente mountain threatened the Christian 
communities of Sultan Kudarat Province and Midsayap and Pikit of North Cotabato. 
Military operations to neutralize the rebel concentration were launched on 2 February 
1974 with three infantry battalions on the attack. There was a suspension of operations 
on the 9th to allow negotiations to take place. Negotiations broke down when the rebels 
demanded that the government forces withdraw from the area, that negotiations be 
conducted in the presence of UN observers and that negotiations be conducted in a third 
country.   Military operations resumed immediately after the peace negotiations broke 
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down and after 52 days the rebels were forced out of the area.75 
/.   The Attack on Jolo 
MNLF rebels attacked Jolo on 7 February 1974. Their objective was to 
weaken the government forces in their secure base and to create a tangible reminder of 
their cause. The attack was especially timed to coincide with the holding of the Islamic 
Summit conference in Lahore, Pakistan. The rebels managed to capture the airport but 
failed to exploit this initial advantage. Government forces engaged the rebels to regain 
areas that came under rebel control. After three days, the rebels withdrew and in then- 
wake they set the town on fire.   Almost two-thirds of Jolo was razed.76 
The rebels failed to hold Jolo long enough to get international recognition 
for their Bangsa Moro Republik (Republic of the Moro nation) because they were 
overconfident of their strength. But over confidence in its ability to defeat the rebels was 
also the reason why military forces decided to step up the pressure against the rebels 
toward the end of January. This provoked the rebels to infiltrate and occupy the town. 
The result was the destruction of Jolo. In losing the battle to control Jolo, the MNLF lost 
prestige and vital access to medicines and information. 
g.  Balabagan Operation 
In Lanao del Sur, a rebel force of 500 men captured the town of Balabagan 
on 23 August 1974. The attack cut off two companies of the 26th Infantry Battalion of 
the Army. Rebels held the town for two weeks before military operations could be 
launched to reestablish government control. Navy ships bombarded the town on 3 
September, followed by the landing of a battalion of marines. The 28th and 33rd. 
Infantry Battalions from Malabang were also mobilized to link up with the Marines and 
take back the town from the rebels. The rebels chose to leave the town instead of facing 
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the combined strength of three battalions.  They burned the town as they left.77 
h.  Cotabato Offensive 
The MNLF launched an offensive on Cotabato City in the early hours of 
30 January 1975. They started the attack with mortar fire directed at the Philippine 
Constabulary Hill in the center of the city. The PC hill, is the headquarters of the joint 
Police Constabulary and Army control, and the Central Mindanao Command (Cemcom). 
About 14 mortar shells slammed into the PC Hill area, killing a teacher and her mother 
and injuring a few others. To neutralize the rebels, the military launched Operation 
Thunderball that called for the control of Tamontaka and Taviran rivers and Tumbao and 
Kakar-Biniruan areas southeast of Cotabato City. Tumbao was captured on the 18th of 
March and the Tamontaka-Tumbao-Taviran river area was cleared and secured by the 
30th of March. This removed the threat to the security of the Cotabato City-Awang 
complex. 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines committed 14 infantry battalions with 
accompanying support units against the Bangsa Moro Army in the Parang-Cotabato- 
Awang complex, the Central Plains of Cotabato and the Kalamansig-Lebak and Tran 
area. The government deployed a total of 50,000 troops or 75-80 percent of the total 
AFP's combat strength in Mindanao and Sulu in the 1973-75 period. 
1.  Diplomatic Offensive 
The escalating cost of military operation against the rebels and the possibility of 
sanctions by the Middle East countries that controlled its oil supply, forced the Philippine 
Government to find other means to resolve the Muslim problem. An orchestrated 
diplomatic offensive was launched aimed at closing the flow of foreign support to the 
Muslim rebels President Marcos gave priority to establishing friendly relations with 
Islamic countries, particularly Egypt which hold a great deal of influence among the 
Arabs. The Philippines also supported the Arab cause in the United Nations to persuade 
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Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. These moves were pursued to win 
over the sympathy of the Arabs and exert influence to halt the flow of foreign aid to the 
Muslim rebels in the south. It was also imperative to win the friendship of these 
countries because of the threat of oil embargo, the Philippines being heavily dependent 
on the Middle East for its supply of oil.78 
The Philippine Delegation to the ASEAN forum made effective use of its position 
in the organization to express great concern over the material and moral support given 
by some foreign countries to the secessionist movement. 
The Philippine government got the support of Indonesia in presenting its case to 
the OIC Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala Lumpur in 1974. Indonesia's influential 
position in the OIC was greatly instrumental in swaying the conferees to agree that 
secession is not the answer to the 'Muslim problem' in the south. The conferees agreed 
that secession is not the solution to the Muslim problem. They urged instead the conduct 
of peace negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government.79 
To dispel rumors that the Philippine Government was waging a genocidal 
campaign against the Muslims, President Marcos invited representatives of the OIC to 
visit and see for themselves the conditions in Mindanao. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minster 
Al Shakaff, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulati al-Obeidi, Somali Foreign Minster Arteh 
Ghalib, and Senegal Ambassador to Egypt Moustapha Cisse responded to the invitation. 
They came to the Philippines after the conference in Kuala Lumpur. The group visited 
Muslim areas in Mindanao and was satisfied of the government programs to uplift the 
welfare of the people. The President later conferred on them the Ancient Order of Sultan 
Kudarat, a decoration forged in honor of the famous Sultan of Maguindanao.80 
78
 Würfel, David, "Southeast Asian Alignments," International journal, Volume 29, 
No.3, Summer, 1974, p. 452. 
79
 Stockwin, H., "Marcos gain fame from the Muslims," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 8 July 1974, pp. 10-11. 
80
 Abat, Fortunato, Op. cit., p. 158. 
54 
The government tried to impress on visiting representatives of the Islamic 
countries that the Philippine policy on the Muslim problem in Mindanao is to undertake 
full-scale socioeconomic development for the advancement of Muslim and other cultural 
minorities. Also it tried to show that it is reducing the use of its armed forces to resolve 
the problem. As part of the administration's policy of pacification and to broaden the 
base of Muslim participation, the government granted amnesty to rebels who joined the 
government's peace and order campaign. More and more Muslims got appointed to 
national and local administrative positions.81 
On 29 May 1974, President Marcos, accompanied among others by Executive 
Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Chairman of the Presidential Task Force for the 
Rehabilitation of Mindanao, met with President Suharto of Indonesia at Menado, North 
Sulawesi. They discussed matters crucial to the solidarity of the region and problems 
affecting ASEAN. What Marcos asked from Suharto and the leaders of Islamic states 
with whom he has taken care to maintain friendly relations was that they refrain from 
intervening in the conflict in Mindanao and allow him to bring about a peaceful solution 
to the problem. Without outside support, the rebels are not expected to fight a successful 
guerilla war. Then, with a massive development effort to channel more of the nation's 
resources to Mindanao, the Administration hoped to improve economic and social 
conditions to a point where it can achieve a peaceful and less costly solution to the 
Muslim problem.82 
Diplomatic moves by the Government apparently had some success, since there 
was a marked decrease in the flow of arms to the rebels. This coincided with the defeat 
of Tun Mustapha in the Sabah elections in the middle of 1975. Mustapha's successor, 
Datuk Harris Salleh, assured the Philippines that he will not support or assist the Filipino 
rebels. 
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3.   Socioeconomic development 
The government also gave emphasis to the policy of wooing the Muslim 
population, extending to them as much economic aid as possible, promoting their cultural 
heritage and attending to their educational and social needs. The Government built more 
roads, irrigation systems and schoolhouses especially in Muslim dominated provinces. 
The Amanah Bank, which served the southern provinces, revised its operations 
to conform with the Islamic concept of banking (no interest and partnership principles). 
It was also tasked to handle the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca so that Muslims could travel 
in relative comfort. Restrictions on the historic barter trade with Borneo was also 
removed.83 
Major portions of loans secured from the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank and other United Nations organizations were invested in infrastructure and 
socioeconomic projects in Mindanao. By pursuing a faster and more meaningful 
development programme, the Administration hoped to win the support of the Muslims 
and deprive the rebels of mass base support.84 
To foster the Muslim culture, an Institute of Islamic Studies was established at 
the University of the Philippines in Quezon City. The government also proclaimed 
Muslim holidays for the region. There was also a commitment of the government to 
codify Muslim laws. 
The Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) was created to foster 
and accelerate the balanced growth of the region. In 1979-80, the SPDA charter was 
revised to concentrate on the development of economically viable ventures. Social 
development functions and non-corporate projects were transferred to the appropriate 
agencies of government.85 A rehabilitation program for MNLF and other allied groups/ 
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individuals working/ cooperating with the government development effort in Southern 
Philippines was also established by the president in 1980 with a special fund of P 25 
million administered through the SPDA. 
4.  Moves to Discredit the MNLF 
Capitalizing on the ideological and ethnic/regional differences within the Muslim 
population and the insecurity of the Christians in the south, the Marcos government 
undertook a program to discredit the MNLF. It tried to show that the MNLF does not 
represent the sentiments of the Filipino Muslims. 
In June 1974, a conference in Marawi City sponsored by the 'Federation of the 
Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu' placed on record its unanimous vote of confidence 
in President Marcos' leadership. It presented a list of proposals that were broadly 
sympathetic with the government's attempts to deal with the problem through 
socioeconomic reform. The government in fact financed the conference.86 
On 17 April 1975, the government initiated a peace conference with rebel leaders 
in Zamboanga City. This was timed to coincide with the negotiations between the 
government and the MNLF in Jeddah. Forty-two "rebel leaders" responded to the 
invitation and attended with 160 of their followers. The MNLF boycotted the meeting, 
however the government claimed that 26 of the men who attended were MNLF leaders. 
An MNLF spokesman admitted that five MNLF cadres did attend but all have already 
gone over to the government. The government got what it wanted from the delegates, a 
statement denouncing Nur Misuari and the MNLF's demand for autonomy. In return 
the Government accepted a list of six demands. These included a call for more 
development funds for the Muslim areas and punishment of corrupt civil and military 
officials.87 
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The Marcos government made strenuous efforts to solicit the support of 
conservative Muslim leaders to convince MNLF members to surrender. Inducements 
came in the form of amnesty and incentives ranging from cash grants, logging 
concessions and scholarships to military commissions and placements in the government 
at the municipal or regional assembly level. 
To further discredit the MNLF in the eyes of the Muslim populace and the 
international community, the government labeled the organization as 'Maoist' and Nur 
Misuari as a Communist. The government also blamed the MNLF for every act of 
violence and lawlessness that occurred in the Southern provinces.88 
5. Policy toward the Muslim's clamor for greater autonomy 
Although the Philippine Government was negotiating with Muslim rebel leaders, 
the official stand was not to allow the rebels to form a separate entity within a federation. 
This was made clear by Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in a rare press 
briefing in November 1974. The Government "will not change the political structure of 
the country," he said. During the briefing attended by senior military officers, Enrile 
announced that contacts have been made with the leaders of the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF). He also announced that the Government was negotiating separately with 
other rebel groups that were not part of the MNLF. According to Enrile and the 
Military, the number of Muslim rebels fighting the Government dropped from the 1973 
peak of 16,000 to about 6,000 in 1974. Enrile however admitted that the mass base 
supporting the armed rebels was still around 400,000.89 
6. Initial Peace Negotiations 
On January 1975, Presidential Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor led the 
government panel that went to Jeddah to discuss initial peace plans with the rebels. The 
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meeting was held under the auspices of the Islamic Conference. The government panel 
noted that they could get down to some constructive haggling with MNLF leaders on an 
informal basis outside the conference room, in truly Filipino manner. Over the 
conference table, the MNLF leaders were unyielding in their demands for full autonomy 
and a separate security force in the south. It was obvious to the Philippine government 
panel that the Libyans were dictating to the Muslim rebel leaders. MNLF negotiators 
refused to do anything but read from a prepared text.90 
During the negotiations, Government negotiators refused to touch on the issue 
of autonomy unless ceasefire procedures were first discussed. MNLF representatives 
were also rigid in wanting to discuss the autonomy issue first. There was no meeting of 
the minds so the negotiations between the Government and the Muslims bogged down. 
The Philippine government accused the MNLF of being manipulated by 'outside forces'. 
Subsequently, Melchor returned to Manila empty handed. The Philippine government 
said it would never again negotiate with the MNLF outside the country. 
7.   The Tripoli Agreement 
The OIC applied continuous pressure to the Philippine Government and the 
MNLF to resume peace negotiations. The Islamic Conference meetings in Jeddah in July 
1975 and Istanbul in May 1976, reiterated the appeal first made by the Conference in 
Kuala Lumpur in 1974, for Manila and the Muslim rebels to resume the talk. 
Philippines' ASEAN partners, Malaysia and Indonesia, also worked behind the scenes 
to arrange for the two sides to resume negotiations. The visit of Libyan Vice-Foreign 
Minister Ali Trekki and other Conference representatives to the Philippines in August 
1976 started the ball rolling for the second round of peace negotiations. Trekki told 
Philippine Government officials that Libyan officials prevailed on the MNLF leadership 
to relax their stand in order to resume talks. He and the other OIC representatives 
brought the message that the MNLF was ready to resume negotiations. President Marcos 
90
 Tasker, Rodney, "The Moro Rebellion, Who calls the shots?" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 14 January 1977, p. 20. 
59 
responded immediately by selecting a panel to represent the Government in talks.91 
The financial support given by Libya and the residency of the MNLF leadership 
in Libya positioned Muammar Qaddafi to strongly influence the MNLF. The influence 
became stronger after the 1976 Islamic Conference in Istanbul when the OIC told Misuari 
that he would have to rely solely on the Libyans for bis supplies, as no other Islamic 
country was prepared to help in the same way. 
During the August visit of the OIC representatives, invitations were exchanged 
for President and Mrs. Marcos to visit Tripoli and for Libyan leader Qaddafi to come 
to Manila. President Marcos took advantage of the invitation to send Mrs. Marcos to 
Tripoli in mid-November. 
The First Lady's visit scheduled to last only two days was extended for another 
two days to enable her to meet with Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The 
meeting resulted in an agreement over the date for the second round of peace 
negotiations. A mutually acceptable joint communique was also issued by both parties. 
The negotiation between the Philippine Government panel and MNLF leaders was to start 
on 15 December in Tripoli. The communique's delicate wording of the passage relating 
to the Muslim rebellion said that the Libyans expressed satisfaction at the positions of the 
Philippine Government and that of the liberation fronts of Muslims, be it Moro or 
elsewhere, in accepting all the resolutions of the Islamic conference aiming at finding a 
justful {sic} solution acceptable to both parties concerned. This was a bit of double talk 
because the Libyans agreed to Manila's claim that the MNLF is only one Muslim rebel 
faction in the south, while "accepting all the resolutions of the Islamic conference" meant 
recognizing the MNLF as the sole spokesman. The Islamic conference resolution called 
for a continuation of talks. While the MNLF wants "belligerent status," the Philippine 
Government can only accord it "non-belligerent status."92 
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National Defense Under-Secretary for Civil Relations Carmelo Barbero led the 
government panel that met with Nur Misuari in the series of talks in Tripoli, Libya 
starting 15 December 1976. The other members of the government panel were 
Philippine Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Liningding Pangandaman, Ambassador to Algeria 
Pacifico Castro and Muslim commissioner for Region XII Simeon Datumanong. Libyan 
Vice Foreign Minister Ali Trekki carried out most of the negotiations on behalf of the 
MNLF.93 
Before the talks, the government launched a carefully orchestrated campaign to 
discredit the MNLF in the government guided media. Marcos' favorite tactic of 'divide 
and rule' was evident in the dailies where feature stories were of pro-Government 
Muslim officials and "youth leaders" in the south rejecting the MNLF's demands and 
saying that the rebel group was not supported by the people and should be dissolved. 
The nine points demand of the MNLF presented during the talks were: Muslim 
control of (1) government and (2) security forces in the south; control of (3) 
administration, (4) judiciary and (5) education up to secondary-school level; (6) economic 
autonomy; the right to participate in the (7) central Government and (8) all organs of the 
State; and (9) the "establishment of Islamic life and society".94 
As the first step toward possible peace settlement, Philippine Government 
representatives and leaders of the MNLF agreed to a cease-fire on 24 December 1976. 
Both panels agreed that cessation of hostilities start on December 24 and be consolidated 
by 20 January 1977. A committee of 52, comprising equal numbers of Government and 
MNLF representatives with Islamic Conference members, would supervise the 
implementation of the cease-fire. Further talks were scheduled in Tripoli from February 
5 to March 3, to hammer out a more substantive agreement. And finally, all being well, 
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a peace agreement was scheduled to be signed in Manila on 7 April, to which Qaddafi 
was invited.95 
The initial agreement promised autonomy to 13 provinces in the south: Tawi- 
Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Palawan, Lanao del 
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato 
and Davao del Sur. The MNLF originally demanded autonomy for the whole of 
Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan area that comprised 21 provinces. The 
Autonomous region would have its own security forces, but under the control of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Muslim courts would be organized to enforce Islamic 
codes relating to administration and personal family relations, but these would have to 
operate under proposed new centrally adopted codes. 
Much of the credit for bringing the two parties to the conference table and 
inducing them to relax their formerly rigid stands sufficiently to reach an agreement of 
sorts goes to a committee of four within the Islamic Conference(representing Libya, 
Senegal, Saudi Arabia and Somalia) and particularly Libya's much maligned leader 
Muammar Qaddafi.96 
8.   Government action to Implement the Tripoli Agreement 
The Government said that the Tripoli Agreement was implementable under the 
regional autonomy system which is allowed under Article II of the Constitution. Said 
Article says that "local governments may group themselves or consolidate or coordinate 
their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them." This 
is precisely the same Article that the MNLF wanted to invoke in the past, which they had 
been told was unacceptable. Working on a loophole that could reduce the size of the 
area granted autonomy, President Marcos said that a plebiscite in the affected areas is 
required by the Constitution, a move that was not discussed in Libya.  People would be 
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asked in the plebiscite whether they wanted to become part of the autonomous region.97 
This was apparently a balancing act by the government. It wanted to appear that it is for 
Muslim autonomy and at the same time would not want to antagonize the Christian 
majority in the proposed autonomous region. 
President Marcos signed a decree on 14 February 1977 ordering the holding of 
a plebiscite in the thirteen provinces that comprised the proposed autonomous region.98 
The plebiscite scheduled on the 21st of February was later reset to 17 March. This was 
to give people ample time to learn the exact nature of the autonomous region. 
Meanwhile, negotiations were in progress in Tripoli. 
The MNLF panel was upset with President Marcos' announcement and threatened 
to resume fighting in the south. Their Libyan host however persuaded them to simply 
agree to a postponement of the plebiscite. The rebels had every reason to be alarmed 
because only five provinces have Muslim majorities in the proposed autonomous region 
of thirteen (13) provinces. They feared the vote would be overwhelmingly against their 
plans for a cohesive Muslim region. 
Establishment of the security forces for the Autonomous region was another area 
of dispute. The Tripoli agreement says that "special regional security forces are to be 
set up in the area of the autonomy for the Muslims in the south of the Philippines. The 
relationship between these forces and the central security forces shall be fixed later." 
Marcos interpreted this provision of the agreement to mean that Muslims could join the 
armed forces.  In one of his speaking engagements, Marcos said, 
That merely means, if you want to join the armed forces, sure, qualify, 
train, by all means because whether you are Muslims or non-Muslims you 
have the right to be a part of the armed forces. . . But to take them out 
bodily without any further qualifications and recognize them as the only 
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armed forces in the area, no 99 
The MNLF interpreted the provision differently. MNLF spokesman Farouk 
Hussin said, "I think in the agreement, it mentions that we will have our own security 
forces. There was no question of being under the direct supervision of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines."100 
The second round of talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF, 
which was to complete the peace settlement agreed upon previously, broke down 
completely by April. The MNLF rejected the Philippine Government's proposal for a 
referendum while the Philippine government accused the MNLF of abandoning its earlier 
acceptance of regional autonomy and reverting to a secessionist position. Both sides also 
accused each other of cease-fire violations. With the breakdown of the talks, Defense 
Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero returned to Manila for consultations. In a meeting of 
the National Security Council, Barbero said that what is needed to break the impasse in 
the peace negotiations is personal diplomacy at the highest level. 
Again President Marcos sent the First Lady, Imelda Marcos to Tripoli to woo 
Qaddafi. The result was an exchange of cables between Qaddafi and President Marcos 
in which they agreed on a settlement. They agreed that President Marcos will quickly 
proclaim autonomy in the 13 provinces, set up a provisional government of "concerned 
parties," and then hold a referendum to settle the administrative details. 
The most important aspect of the agreement was the issue on the holding of a 
referendum. Whatever Qaddafi had in mind, Marcos clearly knew he could use this 
concession to his advantage. He lost no time announcing that in the referendum, people 
would still be asked if they wanted to be part of a single autonomous region, even though 
he had earlier assured the MNLF that they would help to draw up the referendum 
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questions. When asked what was the point of proclaiming autonomy in the 13 provinces 
before the referendum if people could then vote against it, Marcos answer was that every 
province would eventually have a degree of autonomy under his plan to set up 
autonomous regions all over the country. 
The plebiscite was held on 17 April 1977. In 10 of the 13 provinces voters were 
asked whether they approved the merger of their existing two regions into a single 
autonomous region. In the three other provinces, voters were asked whether they wanted 
to join such a region. Voters were also asked if they wanted the MNLF form of 
autonomy, based on the MNLF proposal which called for the setting up of a virtually 
separate state under rebel control or if they wanted the Government's much more diluted 
autonomous arrangement under central control. The result was a more than 90% rejection 
of the MNLF plan. The voters also voted against the formation of a Bangsa Moro 
Islamic state, with its own flag, language, court system and security force under the 
control of the rebel group. Official record showed that most people wanted Manila to 
retain control under its form of limited autonomy for the various parts of the region. 101 
Although 21 embassies accepted the government's invitation to observe the voting, 
the Islamic Conference did not send any delegates. This was to show its displeasure over 
the perceived insincerity of the Philippine government in reaching a peaceful solution to 
the Muslim problem. The OIC's interpretation of the referendum portion of the Qaddafi- 
Marcos agreement was for the plebisicite to decide only the administrative arrangements 
for the autonomous region and not to decide which provinces would be included in said 
region. Predictably, the MNLF boycotted the plebiscite. Misuari himself described the 
plebiscite as "illegal." He also rejected the provisional government setup by Marcos as 
agreed in the exchange of cables with Qaddafi. Regional Commissioner Simeon 
Datumanong and 13 governors comprised the membership of the provisional government. 
Six of the members were Muslims.   Later Marcos increased the membership to 15 and 
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invited the MNLF to supply most of the members including Misuari as chairman. 
Misuari again rejected the offer so the provisional government remained a government 
staffed body under the Department of Local Government and Community Development. 
The Islamic Conference reacted to the Philippine Government actions by issuing 
the 11-point resolution on the Philippines during the meeting in Tripoli. The conference 
deplored Manila's "negative attitude" in "shrinking its international responsibilities and 
obligations" under the Tripoli agreement. Manila was also held responsible for the 
breakdown in negotiations after the Tripoli agreement. It ominously called on Islamic 
countries to support the MNLF "in all ways to achieve all the demands of the Muslims" 
in the area. It recognized the MNLF as the legitimate representative of Muslims in the 
Philippines. It also entrusted the Islamic Conference Secretary-General with the task of 
consulting Islamic states to provide "emergency assistance" to them.102 
Despite the April 1977 breakdown in peace negotiations, the cease-fire remained 
in effect officially. Rebels who clashed with government forces were always referred 
to by government spokesmen as "bandits" to make it appear that the cease-fire was still 
in force. Continued implementation of the cease-fire however dimmed when a landmine 
allegedly planted by the MNLF blew up a lorry carrying plantation workers in the island 
of Basilan. The military launched a retaliatory operation against the MNLF camp in the 
mountainous Mahayahay region of southern Basilan. Air strikes and artillery backed the 
government troops. Pitched battles also occurred simultaneously in Jolo. Although there 
was an escalation in armed confrontation between the government forces and the MNLF, 
the cease-fire was still holding on the whole. 
9.  Resumption of Hostilities 
The fragile ceasefire finally broke down when Brigadier General Teodolfo 
Bautista, five colonels and 27 other officers and men were massacred on 10 October 
1977 in the municipality of Paticul in Jolo.  The General and his men were cut down by 
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the rebels as they entered the marketplace in Danag to negotiate the surrender of the 
rebels. The one responsible for the "act of treachery" was Commander Usman Sali. 
Revulsion over the killing, both in the Philippines and in other countries, gained 
propaganda points for the government. Offensive action by government troops aimed at 
grabbing rebel leader Usman Sali left a large area of Jolo a 'no-man's land'.103 
Fighting between government troops and Muslim rebels resumed in full swing on 
several fronts. Negotiated settlement of the conflict became hopeless with the breakdown 
of the cease-fire. The refugee problem arising from the conflict reached alarming 
proportions. By this time there were 100,000 people in evacuation centers in the region. 
With the renewed hostilities, the MNLF's objective shifted from autonomy to complete 
independence. Misuari instructed his field commanders to drop the autonomy cause and 
instead concentrate on secession.104 
In a turn around, the Marcos government stopped referring to the rebels in the 
south as MNLF. The government reasoned out that the MNLF disintegrated into bands 
of terrorists who carried out more than 600 violations of the cease-fire agreement and 
against whom "police actions" were conducted by the AFP. In the first 'white paper' 
issued since the declaration of Martial Law, the Government justified the action against 
the rebels as "punitive action against terrorists, outlaws and violators of the cease-fire, 
and as defensive action to protect military outposts and to safeguard civilian population 
centers." In an interview with then Far Eastern Economic Review Manila bureau chief 
Rodney Tasker, Marcos justified his not referring to the MNLF by saying, 
Yes, because they have, as I have repeatedly said, been reduced now 
again into the same diverse outlaw bands with their own individual 
objectives. Many of these men, who are engaged in depredations, pillage 
and looting, refuse to receive orders from those whom they call their 
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senior commanders.   That is why we call them outlaws.105 
10.  Organizing the Regional Assemblies 
The holding of the elections to the first Regional Assemblies for Regions 9 and 
12 on 7 May 1979, was in furtherance of Marcos commitment to grant meaningful 
autonomy to Muslim areas in Southern Philippines. Political observers however viewed 
this move of the government to speed up "normalization" of the political situation and 
attain peace in the battle-torn Muslim regions as short on credibility.106 
Despite Marcos personal invitation to Nur Misuari, the MNLF chairman and 
Hashim Salamat who heads the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), to participate in 
the political exercise, the two chose to snub the offer. As planned, the regional 
assemblies were to be organized through elections in the two southern regions where 
Muslims are concentrated. Region nine comprises the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi- 
Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte (including the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan) and 
Zamboanga del Sur (including the cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga). Region 12 covers 
the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and 
Sultan Kudarat and the cities of Iligan, Marawi and Cotabato. Seventeen elected 
representatives, four sectoral representatives and an unspecified number of Marcos 
appointees composed the assembly membership. The regional assemblies as envisaged 
exercised very limited powers. While they could impose taxes and legislate on regional 
affairs within the scope of national programs, they had no jurisdiction over defense, 
security, foreign trade, monetary affairs, communication systems, natural resource 
utilization,  and immigration.   Such limited authority was not acceptable to the MNLF. 
To make the elections successful and within the purview of the Tripoli accord, 
there had to be significant participation of the MNLF. However, candidates with the true 
backing of the MNLF were conspicuously absent.  This greatly dimmed any hope to get 
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an endorsement of the polls by the Islamic conference in its meeting in Morocco. 
Apart from timing the elections to coincide with the opening of UNCTAD V, 
Marcos knew that the day after the election, foreign ministers of the 42-member Islamic 
Conference were due to meet in Morocco. He may have anticipated that by appearing 
to hand over a form of self-government to Muslim areas as demanded by the MNLF, he 
would preempt any move by the Organization of Islamic Conference to take punitive 
action against Manila. 
The traditional political opposition also chose to ignore the elections for it was 
embittered over the result of the previous elections to the Interim National Assembly 
which it claimed to have been massively rigged. What came up were token opposition 
parties against the well-organized ruling party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New 
Society Movement). As predicted, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan candidates swept the 
polls.107 
11.  Rift in the secessionist movement 
Attempts to discredit the MNLF and sow discord among Moro leadership began 
to show some signs of success by the later part of the 1970s. A combination of 
spontaneous splitting within the movement and alternate enlightening and devious policies 
by the government caused a rift in the organization. 
a.  Moro Reform Liberation Movement (MRLM) 
Signs of disunity first became evident in January 1977 when a new group, 
calling itself the Moro Reform Liberation Movement (MRLM) popped up. It sent 
representatives to see Marcos in Manila and demanded for separate negotiations with the 
government. Former MNLF rebels comprised the bulk of the MRLM's membership. 
They claimed to have 26,000 fighters, the same number that the Government claimed to 
have surrendered over the past four years. Whatever the truth of the group's dubious 
claim to being a major faction in the south, the fact that Marcos agreed to consider their 
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resolutions upset the OIC, which insisted that Manila deal only with the MNLF.108 
Many prominent MRLM members had reason to be afraid of reprisals 
under any pro-MNLF autonomous government. For instance one of the MRLM leaders 
was Judge Abdul Hamid Lukman, a former spokesman for the MNLF who surrendered 
to the government and later became the deputy commissioner of Region IX (Nine), 
covering the Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga area. Two others, Maas Bawang Estino 
and Al Caluang, were well known former MNLF field commanders from Jolo. Another 
was Amilpasa Bandaying, a former MNLF fighter who became the aide to Southern 
Command chief Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon.109 
There was lots of speculation why President Marcos decided to bring in 
another Muslim faction into play at said time. It could be that the government 
anticipated that the move would antagonize the Islamic Conference and would therefore 
preempt any finalization of the peace agreement. Taken from another angle, by agreeing 
to talk to all factions, he would be seen to be trying to bring genuine peace to the area. 
MRLM's surprise bid for recognition as another faction of the Muslim 
populace that the government needed to deal with, showed that everything was not well 
within the Secessionist Movement. Throughout the struggle in the south, Misuari and 
his central committee had been based in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. There was known 
to be some disenchantment about this situation among certain MNLF field commanders, 
who, while bearing the brunt of the fighting, felt remote from their leaders. Factionalism 
began to beset the MNLF organization. Many tough field commanders dissatisfied with 
the MNLF leadership  surrendered to the government. 
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b.   The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
A split in the MNLF occurred in the late 1970s because of differing goals, 
revival of traditional tribal rivalries, and competition among Muslim leaders for control 
of the movement. The first break occurred after the April referendum in 1977 when 
Hashim Salamat accused Misuari of autocratic leadership, communist sympathies and 
corruption. Supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, Salamat formed the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MTLF), which advocated more moderate and conciliatory 
approach toward the government. Salamat, a former Islamic scholar at Cairo 
University, chose to establish himself in Cairo after his split with Misuari. His leadership 
appealed to the more fundamentalist Muslims particularly from his own Maguindanaon 
tribe.110 
The MILF ideology emphasized the role of Islam in the struggle for 
autonomy and self-determination. It teaches its followers to embrace Islam as their way 
of life and to make supreme the work of Allah. It considers all Muslims as brothers 
living in a worldwide community called Islamic Ummah. united and equal despite race, 
color or station in life. Its emphasis is the establishment of a strong Bangsa Moro 
Autonomous government in a Bangsamoro homeland where everyone will enjoy equal 
treatment irrespective of creed and religion under a true Islamic system. 
According to the MTLF leadership, the breakaway faction seeks autonomy 
and not secession. It stressed that the MILF abandoned the secessionist stance in 
response to thousands of appeals and resolutions submitted to the OIC calling for just 
solution to the Mindanao conflict. It defined its goals as "the establishment of a 
democratic system of government with equal representation in the executive, legislative 
and judicial departments following the principle of elections . . . centering on self- 
determination, except in foreign affairs and national defense." 
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It also proposed the creation of a regional security force subject to 
discussions in a negotiation with the central government. MILF accepted and recognized 
that Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan are parts of the Philippine Republic. To 
the MILF leadership, the Tripoli Agreement is a major component in the negotiations for 
autonomy, since it involved the participation of the OIC. Regarding its position on the 
territory of the autonomous government, MILF's position was close to the governments 
idea of two autonomous governments.111 
While it is in favor of autonomy, the MILF said it will continue 
stockpiling arms while waiting the result of peace negotiations with the government. 
MILF spokesman and Vice Chairman for Political Affairs, Ghadzali Gaafar said the arms 
buildup will continue "unless we achieve our demands for a genuine autonomy for the 
Bangsa Moro people, including our Christian brothers."112 
c.  Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) 
Misuari's larger and more militant MNLF was further weakened during 
that period when rival leaders formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization. The 
BMLO drew many Mindanao Maranaos away from the MNLF dominated by Misuari's 
Sulu based Tausug tribe. The Saudi Arabia-based leadership of the BMLO was mainly 
pre-martial law Muslim politicians and community leaders who lived in voluntary exile. 
BMLO leader, former congressman Rashid Lucman said that the BMLO differed from 
the Nur Misuari MNLF leadership over tactics and goals in the Muslim struggle. The 
BMLO's ultimate aim is to form a united front to represent Filipino Muslims.113 
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In 1978, MNLF Vice-chairman Abul Khayr Alonto surrendered to the 
government after a difference of opinion with Misuari. His decision to quit the MNLF 
might have been aggravated by Misuari's alleged communist sympathies. He later 
accepted the offer of President Marcos to become the speaker of Region XH assembly. 
d.  MNLF-Reformist Group 
A further split in the MNLF occurred in 1982 when then Vice Chairman 
Dimasangkay Pundato, a Maranao, formed the MNLF 'Reformist Group' (MNLF-RG) 
in Jeddah. Pundato later reached an alliance with the BMLO and the Salamat faction in 
a 'Coordinating Council of the MNLF-BMLO'. Pundato's breakaway was the result of 
a dispute with Misuari over the latter's reversion to a secessionist position.114 
The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization eventually collapsed, giving 
way to the Moro National Liberation Front-Reformist Group. The breakaway group 
declared itself opposed to the extremist left revolutionary ideology of the MNLF. Some 
observers believe that the new group only sought decentralization of power that had 
become a monopoly of the main line MNLF. Pundato is more of a moderate leader who 
seeks only real autonomy in the predominantly Muslim areas. He was believed to be 
based in Sabah when he broke away from Misuari's faction. Though estimates of his 
field strength vary, his faction was viewed by the military as one with more growth 
potential than the other two factions.115 
Moro factionalism, compounded by declining foreign support and general war 
weariness, hurt the Muslim secessionist movement both on the battlefield and at the 
negotiating table. MNLF's Libyan based chairman Nur Misuari, and his former deputy, 
Hashim Salamat, had accused each other of absconding with foreign funds intended for 
the movement. The split in the MNLF coincided with the cooling off of the relationship 
between Misuari and Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi. Misuari later set up MNLF 
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Offices in Damascus, Jeddah and Tehran. He appeared to have shifted his base to these 
places and received support from King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and from the Khomeni 
regime in Iran. 
President Marcos capitalized on the split in the leadership of the MNLF as a 
reason to be reluctant to seek further peace talks with the rebels. Moro fighting strength 
declined to about 15,000 by 1983, as more rebels surrendered to the government. During 
Marcos' last year in office armed confrontation was sporadic.116 
Following the assassination of former senator and opposition leader Benigno 
Aquino on 21 August 1983, the MNLF struggle suffered a loss of momentum. Aquino's 
assassination gave Misuari a reason to reject any further negotiations with the Marcos 
regime. In an interview, Misuari said "We don't want to be identified with a murderous 
regime." He also said that he had been in touch with various factions of the political 
opposition in Manila since Aquino's death. He claimed that these groups were prepared 
to accommodate Muslim demands for independence in a post Marcos scenario.117 
Despite the breakaway of the MILF and MNLF-Reformist Group from the main 
line MNLF organization, it appeared that Nur Misuari still has the predominant following 
in the field and the most prominent leadership status in the Muslim region. However, 
if he persists on maintaining his hard line demand for secession, he could lose the 
support of both the International Islamic community and large parts of the Movement 
who are prepared to negotiate for a more realistic solution to the Moro problem. 
B.   THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO (1986-1992) 
The February 1986 "People's revolution" ousted President Marcos from power 
and Corazon Aquino was sworn in as the next President. Corazon Aquino is the widow 
of the late former Senator Benigno Aquino, the political archrival of Marcos, who was 
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assassinated at the Manüa International Airport in August 1983. Upon her assumption 
to office, President Aquino granted amnesty and released a number of political prisoners. 
The amnesty was part of a confidence building gesture to pursue her reconciliation 
program with all sectors of society. 
Intense diplomacy coming from Southeast Asian capitals and the Middle East 
prompted President Aquino's decision to meet MNLF chairman Nur Misuari early in her 
term. The Aquino family's private links to Misuari also played a key role in bringing 
him back to a meeting with the President after 13 years of exile. The relationship date 
back to the 1970s when members of an anti-Marcos "Sandiean army" connected to 
Agapito "Butz" Aquino's Philippine Democratic Socialist Party, reportedly received 
weapons-training in MNLF camps in Sabah. Butz Aquino is President Aquino's brother- 
in-law. Butz Aquino maintained communication with Misuari during the whole period 
of the Marcos regime. The slain husband of the President, former Senator Benigno 
Aquino was also reported to have made two trips to Saudi Arabia, before his tragic 
death, to meet Misuari.    His purpose was to act as mediator between MNLF and 
Manila.118 
In mid-August 1986, Misuari was confirmed to visit the island of Jolo to attend 
a "Second National Bangsa Moro Congress," scheduled on 2-5 September. Seizing the 
opportunity, President Aquino announced her dramatic gesture of meeting Misuari during 
or after the congress, in Jolo or possibly in nearby Zamboanga City.119 
1.  The Aquino-Misuari Meeting 
Setting aside protocol, President Aquino met with Nur Misuari on 5 September 
in a Roman Catholic convent in Jolo under stringent security. This historic meeting led 
to an agreement between the government and the MNLF providing for the cessation of 
hostilities. More importantly, it laid the ground work for formal discussions aimed at 
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finding a political rather than a military solution to the conflict in Southern Philippines. 
Aquino and Misuari agreed on the continuation of informal, localized cease-fire accords 
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MNLF and that these would 
be formalized. The negotiating timetable called for the initial consolidation of the agreed 
cessation of hostilities. This would be followed by substantive talks that would start 
when both sides had selected their negotiating panels. Peace negotiations were to be 
carried out under the auspices of the OIC. A joint statement named AFP Brigadier 
General Jose Magno and MNLF intelligence chief Abdul Sahrin as the first panelists, 
concentrating on military matters. Named civilian coordinators were the president's 
brother-in-law, Agapito "Butz" Aquino and Sharif Jain Jale, a moderate Muslim from 
Zamboanga.120 
Although local commanders of the Dimas Pundato (Reformist) and the Hashim 
Salamat (Fundamentalist) factions of the MNLF had, as early as April, signed cease-fire 
agreements with military authorities of the AFP Regional Unified Command 12, peace 
in Mindanao, continued to be unstable. Cases of warring Muslim groups and power 
politics caused the uneasy situation in the area. 
There was wide belief that President Aquino committed a tactical error by 
resuscitating Misuari, who no longer commanded the respect of the Muslims. Defense 
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said on 18 October 1986 in Zamboanga City that President 
Aquino had unnecessarily rekindled the Philippine Muslim separatist problem by agreeing 
to meet MNLF chairman Nur Misuari in September.121 
2.   The Jeddah Accord 
In furtherance of the initial agreement between President Aquino and Nur 
Misuari, government negotiator National Affairs Minister Aquilino Pimentel and MNLF 
leader Nur Misuari signed an autonomy agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 4 January 
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1987. The accord proposed to grant autonomy to all of Mindanao and the island 
provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan "subject to democratic processes." 
The words 'democratic processes' refer to the results of the 2 February plebiscite to 
ratify a draft constitution that contained provisions to grant autonomy to parts of the 
country. The other "democratic process" is the need for a stamp of approval by a future 
Philippine legislature and the holding of a plebiscite. In signing the agreement, Misuari 
has indicated that he abandoned his bid for a separate Muslim state and accepted instead 
a form of autonomy within the Philippines.122 
While the agreement might have placated Misuari, it drew resentment from the 
other MNLF splinter groups. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reacted 
sharply at being sidelined in the negotiations and to show its displeasure, conducted 
coordinated attacks on bridges and government buildings. National Affairs Minister 
Aquilino Pimentel quickly patched up the problem by concluding a temporary cease-fire 
with Haji Murad, the deputy leader of the MILF on 18 January. In reaction to the 
violent resentment of the MILF, the government changed its policy toward the conduct 
of peace negotiations with the rebels. Pimentel later announced that the peace panel 
would include all important groups in Mindanao, Christian or Muslim, to discuss a 
comprehensive peace for the troubled island. Besides the violent reaction of the MILF, 
a growing backlash by the Christian majority against Manila's emphasis on the Muslim 
dimension of the island's problem might have triggered the government turnaround.123 
3.   The 1987 Peace Talks 
A 26-point demand submitted by Chief MNLF panelist Habib Hashim to Chief 
government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez on 20 February 1987, revolved around the 
creation of a "semi-parliamentary" Bangsa Moro Autonomous Region (BMAR) headed 
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by a "chief minister" and three deputy chief ministership coming from representatives 
of the Christian, Muslim and tribal communities. The chief minister heads a 16-member 
cabinet and has the power to appoint senior civil servants. He and his government 
would serve appointed terms until 1992- and there after face elections. The MNLF 
claimed that the Philippine Government had already agreed to grant full autonomy to the 
23 provinces mentioned in the proposal.124 
The government maintained that it had agreed only to continue discussion of the 
proposal, subject to the proviso that any final agreement would be subjected to 
"democratic processes." It insisted that the proposal of the MNLF is contrary to the 
Jeddah Accord. By mid-April, the MNLF retreated from its 23 province demand to just 
13 provinces and for the other 10 provinces to be the subject of plebiscite. Pelaez 
initially welcomed the shift but after consulting with the President, he reported on 21 
April that the government would not budge on plebiscite and constitutional procedure. 
As the 9 May expiration of the MNLF-govemment cease-fire agreement loomed, both 
sides tried feverishly to arrive at a mutually agreeable arrangement on the autonomy 
issue. The government rejected MNLF notions to use Aquino's residual decree-making 
powers to create a Bangsa Moro Autonomous Region (BMAR) of at least 13 provinces. 
The Government could not accede to the MNLF demands, noting that the Constitution 
and the Jeddah Accord do not sanction the steps suggested. Culpable violation of the 
Constitution would have exposed Aquino to possible impeachment. Consequently, the 
peace talks collapsed and the Moro insurgency remained unresolved.125 
4.  Developments After the 1987 Peace Talks 
Despite breakdown of the talks, the Government pursued its Constitutional 
mandate to form an autonomous region in Southern Philippines. The Mindanao Regional 
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Consultative Commission (MRCC) was organized and tasked to help Congress in drafting 
an "Organic act" for the proposed autonomous region. The Office of the Peace 
Commissioner (OPC) supervised the formation of the MRCC. The OPC, with the 
Mindanao Consensus Building Panel, evolved a selection process that sought fair and 
adequate representation of all affected sectors. From an initial list of nominees, the 
President personally interviewed and selected the 52 MRCC Commissioners. 
The MRCC was officially constituted on 26 March 1987. Besides the usual 
plenary sessions, the Commissioners held a series of consultations with their constituents 
to ensure that the draft organic act duly reflected their aspirations. The MRCC 
leadership submitted to Congress an unfinished working document in October. The body 
was not able to reach consensus on key aspects of the organic act in the time allotted to 
them. Only eight articles reached second reading. None of the provisions however, 
reached a third and final reading. Despite its drawbacks, the Executive Branch duly 
recognized the significance of the MRCC document. Many provisions reflect the 
aspirations of the various sectors in the region. Later, Congress used the MRCC output 
as a valuable input in formulating the organic act for the autonomous region in Southern 
Philippines. 
5.  Dismissal of Dimasangcay Pundato as head of MNLF-RG 
The MNLF-RG tried to realign with the MNLF and MILF during the talks 
between the Aquino Government and the Nur Misuari faction. The Reformist group was 
hoping to gain national recognition and to initiate the formation of a broader political 
base. The Reformist group however, was accused of having betrayed the Muslim rebel 
movement for participating in government reconciliation programs in the region. 
Pundato's appointment as Executive director of the Office of Muslim Affairs 
(OMA) on 27 October 1988 led to his dismissal as head of the MNLF-Reformist Group. 
Despite his dismissal, Pundato continued to advance the interest of the Muslims. His 
program at the Office of Muslim Affairs gave priority to institution building, 
organizational development and community building. Emphasis was given to the 
enhancement and institutionalization of Madarasah, Shariah, Islamic financial institutions, 
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pilgrimages, endowments and even Quran readings. Agricultural and small business 
cooperatives, adult education and functional literacy programs and human resources 
developments in the Muslim sector were also of great interest to the OMA. 
6.  The Organic Act of 1989 
In August 1989, an organic act offering significant autonomy for Mindanao 
became part of the law of the land. A plebiscite held in November decided which of 
Mindanao's thirteen provinces and nine major cities would join the autonomous region. 
Nur Misuari rejected the plebiscite as a violation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. He 
urged the five million Muslims to boycott it, and threatened to reignite his armed struggle 
for independence. Despite Misuari's threats, the plebiscite was relatively peaceful and 
voter turnout was moderate. As expected, only four provinces with Muslim majorities 
voted to join the autonomous region.126 
The four Muslim-dominated provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and 
Lanao del Sur composed the new Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
Elections for a regional governor, vice governor and a 21-man legislative assembly 
followed the holding of the plebiscite. The election was set the following February. 
Zacaria Candao won the seat for regional governor of the Autonomous Region 
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) on February 1989. As regional governor, Candao's 
initial thrust was the laying of the foundations for the ARMM while on the side he tried 
to find ways to surmount intertribal differences, mediate in family feuds, and raise more 
money for his badly depleted treasury. Given the way intertribal rivalry led to a degree 
of fragmentation within the Muslim secessionist MNLF, observers expected conflicts 
between the Tausugs from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the Maguindanaos and the Maranaos 
from Lanao del Sur, to remain near the surface in the new administration. There was 
some effort to strike a balance in the regional autonomous government. Candao is a 
Maguindanao, while vice-governor Ben Loong and   assembly speaker vice-governor 
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Ismael Abubakar are both Tausugs.  The rest of the autonomous government comprises 
three representatives from Tawi-Tawi, and six each from Sulu, Lanao del Sur and 
Maguindanao. 
Although the MNLF rejected the new organic act and the result of the plebiscite, 
it decided to respect an informal truce forged after the cancellation of the peace talks. 
The MNLF instead embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to gain international 
recognition to its cause. In particular, it targeted the influential Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) for its campaign for recognition. It made a bid for full membership 
in the body. When the MNLF first submitted its application, the OIC turned it down. 
It expects to renew its bid in succeeding OIC meetings. 
C.   THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS (1992-TO DATE) 
Fidel V. Ramos was elected president by popular vote in the May 1992 elections, 
which saw as many as seven presidential contenders. He won over Miriam Defensor 
Santiago, his closest contender who ran under the Peoples Reform Party (PRP), Eduardo 
Cojuanco of the National Peoples Coalition (NPC), Jovito Salonga of the Liberal Party 
(LP), Imelda Marcos of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan Party (KBL), Ramon Mitra of the 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Salvador Laurel of the Nationalista Party 
(NP).127 The rebellions of the left (the communist), of the right (disgruntled military 
leaders), and of the Muslims in the south were the major sources of instability in the 
Aquino government that Ramos inherited. To come up with a workable national 
reunification programme, the President tried to reach out to every shade of rebel group. 
The National Unification Commission (NUC) created in September 1992 spearheaded the 
President's peace effort. Former Election Commissioner and University of the 
Philippines law professor Haydee Yorac headed the commission. To show its sincerity 
in its effort to solve the various insurgencies, one of the first actions of the Ramos 
Administration was to pass Republic Act 7636.  The new law repealed the 35 year old 
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anti-subversion law and in effect legalized the Communist Party of the Philippines.128 
The NUC brought together the various groups that had been fighting against the 
government to discuss the attainment of peace. Ambassador Manuel Yan heads the 
government panel tasked to negotiate with the MNLF. Batangas Representative Eduardo 
Ermita is his vice-chairman. 
1.  Peace Negotiations 
Negotiators from the Ramos government first met with MNLF head, Nur Misuari, 
in Indonesia in April 1992. After several delays, both panels agreed to start formal talks 
the following year in Indonesia. On 14-16 April 1993, Nur Misuari and a Philippine 
Government panel headed by Representative Eduardo Ermita met in Jakarta. The 
objective of the meeting was to discuss the mechanics of the peace talks. The 
government agreed to let the OIC be the facilitator in the talks in Mindanao. Both sides 
further agreed to begin peace negotiations before the end of June. Libya again played 
a major role in arranging the April meeting in Jakarta.129 
Although MILF representatives were not included in the Jakarta meeting, it 
remained predisposed to participate in the peace process. It formed its own peace panel 
and presented four points aimed at reaching a just and peaceful, social, economic and 
political solution to the problems in Southern Philippines. The MILF talking points are: 
resumption of discussions on the Tripoli agreement, safe return and rehabilitation of 
refugees to their places of origin, cessation of hostilities and provocative acts during the 
peace process and other matters that may contribute in arriving at a just and peaceful 
social, economic and political solution to the problem.130 
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Significantly, the conferees in the Islamic Conference Foreign Minister's meeting 
in Karachi, Pakistan decided to temporarily set aside the MNLF membership bid in order 
not to disturb the peace negotiations. The OIC replaced the membership issue with 
something related to economic reconstruction in Muslim Mindanao in its agenda. 
The Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front signed an 
interim cease-fire agreement in Jakarta on 7 November 1993.131 Ground rules and 
guidelines for the ceasefire were formulated by a joint ceasefire committee headed by 
Brig. Gen. Guillermo Ruiz and Abdul Sahrin of the MNLF. The ceasefire agreement 
covered the 13 provinces and nine cities originally provided for in Article UJ of the 
Tripoli agreement. The provinces covered were: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga 
del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan 
Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur,  and Palawan. 
The two panels conducted a second mixed committee meeting on 6-7 April 1994 
in Zamboanga City. During the meeting, Nur Misuari said that in his consultation with 
various sectors in Mindanao, the feed back that he got is that the people in the region are 
clamoring for peace. He said that he was convinced that the MNLF should now give 
peace a maximum chance to succeed and to pursue the peace process to its logical end. 
Areas where both panels had some difficulty agreeing are the transition of autonomy, the 
issues on national defense and regional security forces and the judiciary and shariah law. 
On 13 April, the Committee on the Judiciary and Shariah Law completed their special 
meeting and were able to agree on a consensus.132 
2.  The Muslim Extremist Movement 
Breakaway factions of the MNLF, however, threaten to disrupt the peace 
negotiations between the government and the Muslim rebels.   The Muslim Extremist 
131
 See: "Philippines, Ceasefire Accord," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 
November 1993, p. 15. 
132
 Aguinaldo, Sandra S., "Peace with the MNLF," Business World, 9 May 1994, 
p. 6. 
83 
Movement in the Philippines has become the most disruptive of the breakaway faction. 
The Extremist group started out as a local version of Tabligh (preachers of Islam) 
movement in Marawi City. Radical and young Muslims soon infiltrated the Tabligh, 
espousing the basic Islamic teachings based on the Quran and advocating the use of 
terrorism. The rise of the extremist group was attributed to the feeling among some 
Muslims that the MNLF has betrayed the Islamic cause by negotiating with the 
government for peace terms. The group recognized Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani as 
their leader. Janjalani is also known by his alias, Comdr. Abu Sayaff or Abusayap 
(Servants of Allah). The Abu Sayaff Group numbering 680 are active in Isabela, Tipo- 
Tipo, Sumisip and Lantawan, all in Basilan, and in Campo Muslim and Mariki in 
Zamboanga City. The new recruits reportedly underwent training in demolition and 
sabotage operations under foreign trained MNLF rebels in various training camps in 
Isabela. There were reports that they were coordinating their efforts with the local 
MNLF units operating in Basilan and Zamboanga del Sur.133 
Efforts to establish MNLF alliance with the Muslim extremist group began on 18 
March 1992 in Pakistan. There were reports that the Jamiatul Al-Islamic Tabligh (JAT) 
invited members of the MNLF Central Committee to integrate the MNLF plans with the 
programs of JAT. On 22 May 1992, the MNLF Central Committee approved the 
proposal that all MNLF military plans and projects should pass through the JAT Central 
Committee for proper study and appropriate funding. This reported formal MNLF-JAT 
alliance added a new dimension to the MNLF strategy because of the increased militancy 
of the Abu Sayaff Group. 
The Abu Sayaff group also made some overtures to join the MILF in December 
1994 but was turned down. The MILF leadership wanted the group to first renounce 
terrorism against civilians before their membership could be considered. MILF vice- 
chairman Ghazali Jaafar voiced out the sentiments of the MILF when he said, 
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We don't agree in the manner Abu Sayaff is undertaking its struggle. 
Islam clearly prohibits the killing of women, children, the elderly and 
leaders of other religions.134 
There were at least 44 reported terrorists activities from May 1992 to May 1993 
attributed to the local Muslim Extremist Group. These are broken down into 25 
bombings, 13 kidnaping, five liquidations and one mortar shelling incident, mostly 
committed in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga City. These acts of terrorism resulted in 15 
persons killed, two of whom are missionaries, and 93 injured mostly Roman Catholic 
devotees. Military and police launched surgical operations against Muslim Extremist 
Groups and MNLF lost commands involved in kidnaping and other criminal activities in 
Isabela, Basilan starting 3 May 1993 . The operation resulted in 46 rebels killed. The 
government  suffered eight casualties and five wounded in action. 
Kidnaping of American linguist Charles Walton in November 1993 brought back 
the Muslim rebellion in the south to world focus. The kidnaping of five foreigners 
including two Spanish nuns over the past 12 months by renegade Muslim bands known 
as "Lost Commands" revealed the weak control of the MNLF over the various Muslim 
armed groups. A series of bombings in Davao City in December 1993, including three 
explosions at San Pedro Cathedral, resulted in the death of six people. These incidents 
heightened fears of a renewed religious war in the Southern Philippines. 
In June 1994, Abu Sayaff rebels stopped a busload of 60 people, many of them 
school teachers, on Basilan island. The rebels immediately killed fifteen of the 
passengers. They later released thirty-seven and held the rest as hostage for weeks. 
They were eventually freed after payment of a substantial ransom.135 
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The most recent incident involving the Abu Sayaff guerillas was the attack on Ipil 
in Zamboanga del Zur on 4 April 1995. The Muslim separatists killed 46 people, 
robbed banks and burned the town's business district.136 
Military intelligence sources say the group is in possession of recently bought 
high-powered arms and that Pakistani veterans of the war in Afghanistan are helping to 
train its fighters. Sayaff s lieutenants are mostly Filipino Muslim volunteers who joined 
the International Islamic Brigade that fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. With the ability 
and the will to conduct a campaign of urban terrorism, Abu Sayaff emerged as one of 
the most serious threats to national security. 
The MNLF and MILF officially denied any formal links with Abu Sayaff. 
Authorities, however, suspect that the MNLF tolerated the existence of Abu Sayaff. The 
MLNL and the Abu Sayaff Group have their power-bases in the Sulu and Basilan islands. 
There are persistent military intelligence reports that MNLF veterans had been training 
Abu Sayaff fighters. Some members of Abu Sayaff are the sons of MNLF guerillas 
killed by government forces in the 1970s, who now feel duty-bound to avenge their 
fathers. 
In spite of the disruptive activities of MNLF splinter groups, President Ramos 
remains confident that his emphasis on conciliation and consensus building will ultimately 
triumph over the innate fractiousness of Philippine politics. "I would like to believe that 
we have gradually built up social cohesion," Ramos says. "We are getting people who 
were bitter political rivals to get together, and realize that there is now a common goal." 
Ambassador Manuel Yan, chairman of the government panel negotiating with the Muslim 
rebels and the concurrent Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process said peace efforts 
by the Government should be seen in the light of the country's economic take off. He 
further said that the peace process is the principal cornerstone of the Ramos 
Administration goal of becoming a newly industrialize country by the year 2000. 
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Looking back into how government tried to resolve the secessionist problem in 
the south, the Marcos administration initially used the military solution to control the 
Muslim rebels.   Instead of dissipating, the rebels gained strenth and found support in 
Middle East countries who rendered foreign assistance to the rebel cause.  The Marcos 
government shifted strategy and launched a diplomatic campaign to bring the sympathy 
of the Middle East countries to the side of the Philippine government. Coupled with this 
the government initiated a policy of attraction to the Muslim rebels to lay down their 
arms. Socio-economic development in the South was also intensified to show the people 
there that the government was intent on improving their welfare.  These actions resulted 
in diminished rebel activity.   Peace negotiations under the Marcos regime were not 
however successful because of the perceived insincerity of the government to implement 
meaningful autonomy to the Muslim region in the south.   The Aquino government, 
building on private ties with Nur Misuari, tried to resolve the secessionist problem by 
initiating peace negotiations with the MNLF.   By that time, the MNLF had split into 
three factions.  The Aquino government's concentration of peace negotiations with one 
faction antagonized the other factions.   The government had to change its negotiating 
policy to appease the various groups that were left out in the negotiations.  The Marcos 
and Aquino governments were firm in their positions that autonomy will only be in the 
areas where the people had so expressed in a referendum that they are amenable to such 
status.  There was no meeting of the minds between the government and the rebel panel 
because Nur Misuari, the chairman of the MNLF was equally adamant of his position 
that the Tripoli Agreement be followed to the letter.    The Ramos government, in 
resuming the negotiations with the Muslim rebels, is trying to avoid the pitfalls that the 
previous governments encountered. By widening the scope of the negotiations to include 
all important interest groups in the South, the Ramos administration hopes to come up 
with a solution that would be acceptable to the majority of the people. 
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V. HOW OTHER COUNTRIES RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF SEPARATISM 
The wave of ethnic nationalism and unrest that we are witnessing in various parts 
of the world today is challenging the existence of nation-states. Several factors have 
contributed to the growth of ethnic nationalism. One factor is the democratization of 
former authoritarian societies. Democratization has allowed ethnic minorities greater 
freedom to express themselves. Another factor is the greater international concern for 
human rights that tend to override the traditional respect for sovereignty and non- 
interference in the internal affairs of a country.   A third factor is the bigger role that 
• •        137 
emerging regional powers play to influence neighboring countries. 
When a group of people composing a minority within an existing state, become 
increasingly aware of their separate and distinctive identity try to seek some degree of 
self government short of total independence to preserve said identity, we have a case of 
separatism.138 
If that group of people attempt to establish a separate sovereign state, what we 
have    is    secession. Collective    ethnic    consciousness    will    trigger    off   a 
separatist/secessionist movement. Ralph R. Premdas in his article entitled "Secessionist 
Movements in Comparative Perspective" said: 
The object of secessionist quest is first to affirm a boundary 
between 'its people' and 'others'. The 'we-they' dichotomy is essential 
to its identity. This is often followed by a claim to territory for self- 
government. Where the 'people' and 'territory' are both clearly 
distinguishable and separable, the claim to autonomy is in part validated 
and reinforced by these facts. Often, however, neither people nor 
territory can be desegregated, easily reassembled and homogenized 
without strong counterclaims and acrimonious controversy. Regardless, 
the secessionist claim cannot be contained by these practical objections. 
Its aim, however, can be attained either in the form of a proper sovereign 
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State or in a semi-sovereign segment of a decentralized state  . . . 
A secessionist movement: 
1. May have several contending factions each claiming the mantle 
of legitimacy to represent the aspirations of the group . . . The word 
'movement' contains a dynamic element suggesting struggle and 
resistance. If there is no struggle there is no need for a movement. A 
secessionist struggle embodies action, tension and resistance. . . The 
longer the struggle, the more likely that the history of the movement, with 
its heroes and legends, will become part of the added baggage of 
emotional claims to be defended and upheld. 
2. Invariably seeks a territorial base, which is often enshrined in 
the claim to a 'homeland' in which to govern itself, avoid exploitation and 
preserve its way of life. A movement that seeks to obtain recognition of 
its cultural values, but does not seek a separate territory, cannot be 
regarded as secessionist . . . 
3. May be sustained in its claims by alleged underlying unique 
factors such as common language, religion, race and values. These 
primordial features may be mythical or apply only to a core within the 
claimed population. 
4. Is involved in a moral quest. It affirms a right to self 
determination as God-given and natural. It is asserted as a collective 
group right. . . Without a recognized and widely accepted doctrine of 
self-determination, few secessionist movements would arise.139 
Premdas further said that organization, ideology, leadership, response of the state 
and the conflict-management techniques it deploys and the attitude of the international 
community determines the evolution of any given separatist/secessionist movement.140 
The separatist/secessionist movements in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma will 
be viewed in light of the above framework and a comparative analysis will be made with 
the Philippine separatist/secessionist problem. 
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A.   THE SEPARATIST PROBLEM IN SRI LANKA 
Sri Lanka is an island state populated mainly by two major ethnic groups, the 
Sinhalese, and the Tamils. Sinhalese constitute 74 percent of the Sri Lanka's population 
and are mostly Buddhist. They speak Sinhala. an Indo-European language similar to the 
language in Northern India. On the other hand, the Tamils constitute 18 percent of the 
total population and form the largest ethnic minority group in the country. They are 
predominantly Hindu and speak the Tamil language, which is a Dravidian language 
spoken in South India. The Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian or plantation Tamils form 
the two subgroups of Tamils. Sri Lankan Tamils are descendants of the Tamils of 
Dravidian stock who arrived in Sri Lanka a few centuries after the arrival of the 
Sinhalese. The Indian Tamils are descendants of the Tamils from South India who came 
to the island starting in 1830 to work in the plantations. The population of this subgroup 
is shrinking through repartriation programs to Tamil Nadu in India.141 
The country was successively colonized, first by the Portuguese in the 16th 
century, then the Dutch, and finally by the British in the late 18th century. The British 
succeeded in uniting the island that they named Ceylon. During colonial rule, the British 
treated the Tamils more favorably than the Sinhalese, enabling the Tamils to avail of 
more educational and civil service opportunities.142 
1.  Independence and the Emergence of Political Parties 
British rule ended with the signing of the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947. The 
United National Party (UNP), founded by Don Stephen Senanayake emerged as the 
largest political party after independence. The party derived its popular support from the 
Sinhalese majority regions of central, southern and western Sri Lanka. The UNP won 
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the first national elections in 1947.143 
A split in the UNP occurred in July 1951 when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's left of 
center bloc bolted out of the party and formed the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). 
Thereafter, the contest over the reigns of the government would be between the two 
parties. While the UNP was more conciliatory towards Tamil interests, the SLFP 
became the advocate of Sinhalese dominance.144 
In the 1956 elections, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike organized a coalition of political 
groups to form the People's United Front. Campaigning on a platform that advocated 
Sinhalese control over trade and industry and the use of Sinhala as the only official 
language, the PUF won the elections. After the elections, the new government 
proceeded to fulfill its election promise by presenting the Official language Act to 
parliament, declaring Sinhala as the only official language. The passage of the act 
resulted in an increase in antagonism between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. 
Prior to independence in 1947, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress emerged as the 
first political party dedicated to the protection of the welfare of the Tamil ethnic 
minority. It tried to secure from the British adequate constitutional safeguards for the 
Tamils. They were afraid that British domination would simply give way to Sinhalese 
domination. In 1949, radical members of the Tamil Congress felt that their political 
interests were being ignored by the mainstream political parties led by Buddhist 
Sinhalese. They believed that the only way to preserve Tamil identity was to create an 
autonomous Tamil state within a federal union of Sri Lanka. These radicals led by S. 
J. V. Chelvanayakam broke away from the Tamil Congress and formed the Federal 
party. Subsequently, because of its more aggressive stance, the Federal Party displaced 
the conciliatory Tamil Congress as the major Tamil party.145 
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2.  Protest Actions Against the Government 
Following the passage of the Official Language Act in the parliament, the Federal 
Party led a nonviolent protest that ended in a pact between Bandaranaike and S.J.V. 
Chelvanayakam providing for Tamil autonomy in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
It also provided for the use of the Tamil language in administrative matters. The 
agreement was not consumated because the Buddhist clergy protested it. 
The assassination of Bandaranaike in September 1959 led to a brief take over of 
the reigns of government by the United National Party. In the July 1960 elections, the 
widow of the former prime minister, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike, led the SLFP 
to victory to become the first woman prime minister. Her first official act was to carry 
out the policy making Sinhala the only official language of Sri Lanka. In reaction, the 
Tamils launched a civil disobedience campaign in the restive Northern and Eastern 
provinces.146 
The elections of March 1965 resulted in UNP regaining the upper hand. The 
UNP tried to earn favor with the Tamils by enacting the Tamil Regulations in 1966. The 
regulations made Tamil a language officially parallel to Sinhala in Tamil speaking 
regions. Sinhalese activists immediately expressed hostility toward the Tamil Regulations 
and civil violence followed. The government had to declare a state of emergency to 
control the disorder. 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike returned to power in 1970 on a platform that promised 
radical structural changes, including land reform, increased rice subsidies and 
nationalization of local and foreign banks. After assuming the prime ministership, 
Bandaranaike tolerated the radical left. When she lost control over the radicals, she 
declared a state of emergency in March 1971. In reaction to the declaration of state of 
emergency, the People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna- JVP) launched 
a blitzkrieg operation to take over the government in April. The rebel offensive nearly 
overthrew the government.   The military suppressed the movement and imprisoned the 
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top leadership and about 16,000 suspected insurgents.147 
3.   Government Policies Detrimental to Tamil Interests 
A new constitution promulgated in May 1972, transformed Sri Lanka into a 
republic. The constitution vested legislative, executive and judicial functions of 
government on the National State Assembly. While the constitution guaranteed primacy 
for the Buddhist religion among the religions in Sri Lanka, it lacked provisions for 
federalism and protection of the rights of minorities. These earned the ire of the Tamils. 
Government sanctions to discriminate against Tamil youth in university admissions 
aggravated the matter. Sinhalese believed that the disproportionate favorable allocation 
of university places for Tamils was the result of Jaffna having a superior secondary 
school system. To compensate for disparities in educational facilities, the Sinhalese 
controlled government made the requirements for admission of Tamils in the university 
more stringent than those of Sinhalese students to make the outcome more equal. 
Tamils, however, rejected such steps as maneuvers designed to discriminate against 
them.148 
The government also embarked on a land policy which allocated state land for 
cultivation to Sinhalese families in the 'traditional Tamil homeland'. The influx of many 
immigrants slowly changed the demography in Trincomalee and Ampara districts in the 
eastern province. Tamils strongly objected to the land policy for they believed that they 
had the right to prior claim to land which they considered their homeland. Tamils were 
afraid that if the migration of Sinhalese in traditional Tamil areas continue, they would 
be swamped by the Sinhalese. A demographic change would result in an electoral 
imbalance that would favor the Sinhalese. If this happens, they would lose control over 
a homeland that provided them security from ethnic violence. On the other hand, 
Sinhalese do not accept that Tamils have prior claims, more so, an exclusive claim to any 
part of the country especially the east.  They asserted that it is economically justified to 
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149 
allocate land to the landless irrespective of ethnic considerations.1 
4.  Formation of Tamil Secessionist Movements 
In reaction to the discriminatory aspects of the 1972 constitution and preferential 
policies that favored Sinhalese, Tamils founded the Tamil United Front in 1974. In 
1976, it became the Tamil United Liberation Front (TUFL). The aim of the TUFL is 
to establish a separate Tamil state called 'Eelam'.150 Tamils saw the government 
policies on the official language, university admissions and land settlement and also the 
periodic outburst of ethnic violence as a systematic process of relegating their status to 
that of second-class citizens. In the 1977 general elections, the TULF asked the 
electorate to give it a mandate for 'Eelam'. Voters responded by endorsing the TULF 
position. The party won all fourteen seats in the Northern Province and four seats in the 
East.151 
The death of Chelvanayakam before the elections left the party without strong 
leadership. Tamil separatist underground groups collectively known as Tamil Tigers 
filled the vacuum left by Chelvanayakam. These militant groups failed to unite because 
of ideological reasons, regional affinities, caste and competition for leadership. The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LLTE) founded in 1972 by VelupiUai Prabhakaran 
emerged as the strongest of these groups. The Jaffna peninsula became the power base 
oftheLTTE.152 
A new constitution promulgated in 1978 contained substantial concessions for the 
Tamils. It gave legal legitimacy to the official use of the Tamil language. This did not 
however fully satisfied the Tamils. Inadequate resources hampered the move to use the 
Tamil language in administration and this became a cause of Tamil frustration.   To 
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further assuage the Tamils, Jayewardene also abrogated the "standardization" policy, 
which made university admission criteria for Tamils more difficult. Tamil civil servants 
also received appointments to many top-level positions. In spite of all these concessions, 
the Tamil Tigers escalated their terrorists attacks, which provoked Sinhalese backlash 
against Tamils and therefore precluded any successful accommodation. 
5. Communal Riots 
The first nationwide communal riot after independence occurred in May 1958. 
The disturbance was sparked by a rumor that a Tamil killed a Sinhalese. Many Tamils 
died in the riots. It left a deep psychological scar between the two major ethnic groups. 
The most savage communal riot in Sri Lankan history occurred in 1983. It was 
sparked by the ambush of an army patrol where thirteen Sinhalese soldiers died. The 
communal disturbance that followed resulted in a death toll of 400, mostly Tamils. 
About 150,000 Tamils fled the island. The conflict acquired international dimension 
when the refugees gained sympathy and asylum in India. Tamil militants also got 
material support and military training in India. The biggest support came from Tamil 
Nadu, the Indian province with a majority of Tamil population.153 
6. Start of Peace Negotiations 
The government of President J. R. Jayewardene initiated an All-Party Conference 
in late 1983 aimed at finding a solution to the separatist problem. The parties that 
attended the conference were the ruling UNP, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
and the largely Sinhalese opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freeedom Party (SLFP). The 
position of the Tamil delegation was outlined in a prepared statement entitled "Four 
Principles". The statement called for recognition of (1) the Tamils as a "distict 
nationality," (2) the Tamil-populated areas as a Tamil "homeland," (3) the right of self- 
determination for the Tamils, and (4) the right to citizenship for all Tamils residing in 
Sri Lanka. The Jayewardene government did not accept the Tamil demands on the 
grounds that these in essence constituted a demand for a separate state.   The failure of 
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the negotiations signaled the renewal of terrorist attack by the Tamil rebel forces.154 
7.  Events that led to Indian Intervention 
In the period between 1983 and 1987, the Jayewardene administration focused its 
efforts to strengthening its military forces. When it gained sufficient strength, it 
launched a major attack on LITE positions in the Jaffna peninsula. Within two weeks 
the Sri Lankan forces overcame LITE resistance and were about to take Jaffna town. 
It was at this point that India directly intervened. A flotilla of fishing boats loaded with 
supplies were first sent by the Indians but the Sri Lankan navy turned them back. The 
next move was to air drop supplies. The Indian action was a public announcement that 
it would not allow the Sri Lankan government to vanquish the Tamil rebels militarily. 
The Indian Ambassador in Sri Lanka informed the Colombo government that India would 
intervene militarily if the Sri Lankan offensive in the north continued.155 
The presence of Indian and 'stateless' plantation Tamils in Sri Lanka were an 
important reason for Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. For over forty 
years, India had been negotiating with Sri Lanka to solve the problem of plantation 
Tamils of Indian origin. An agreement reached between the two governments in 1964 
and 1974 called for India to take 600,000 and Sri Lanka 375,000 plus the respective 
natural increases in each group. Over a fifteen-year period, there was partial 
implementation of the agreement. One hundred thousand stateless Tamils who should 
have applied for Indian citizenship failed to do so and the repatriation of those who got 
Indian citizenship fell behind schedule. When ethnic violence broke out against the 
Tamils in July 1983, the Indian government immediately expressed concern over the 
safety of its citizens in Sri Lanka. The influx of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to India 
compounded India's concern. The use of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu as a 
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base of operation by Tamil militants, was the second factor that brought involvement of 
India into the Sri Lankan conflict. Not wanting to invite the conduct of terroristic 
activities inside India, the Indian government was careful not to antagonize the opposition 
in Tamil Nadu by allowing them to support the Sri Lankan Tamils. India's perception 
of itself as the South Asian regional power and the expectation that Sri Lanka should 
conduct its affairs in a manner that would not undermine India's own security and 
interest was the third factor that drew India into the conflict.156 
8.  The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord 
The Sri Lankan government decided to seek a negotiated settlement when it 
realized that India stood in the way of a possible military victory over the separatists. 
In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. The separatist 
groups were not signatories to the Accord. The salient points of the Peace Accord are: 
(1) it provided a framework for the settlement of the ethnic conflict, (2) it affirmed Sri 
Lanka's multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state composed of the four main ethnic groups; 
the Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Burghers (3) it recognized that the Northern and 
Eastern provinces were areas of "historical habitation of the Tamil speaking population," 
(4) it committed the Sri Lankan government to the establishment of a system of 
provincial councils with devolved powers, (5) it called for the temporary merging of the 
northern and eastern provinces into one administrative unit which could be made 
permanent if approved by a referendum in the east, (6) it called for a ceassation of 
hostilities within forty eight hours of the signing of the agreement and (7) the surrender 
of weapons within seventy two hours by the rebels.157 
At the invitation of the Sri Lankan president, an Indian peacekeeping force landed 
in Sri Lanka to assist in the collection of arms from the militants. Many of the Sinhalese 
bitterly resented the signing of the Accord and the arrival of the Indian troops. 
Significant groups of Sinhalese in the southwestern region saw the provisions of the 
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Accord relating to the Provincial Councils as being imposed by India and a mass 
mobilization was organized to try to over turn it. The Tamil population however, 
warmly welcomed the Accord and the IPKF, with the exception of the LITE who 
refused to hand over all its weapons. The relationship between the LTTE and the IPKF 
quickly turned to one of open hostility. The original IPKF token force of 6,000 rose to 
over 60,000 and stayed for over two and a half years in the north east to try to defeat 
the Tamil rebels. In time, not only the Sinhalese but many Tamils came to view the 
IPKF as an army of occupation.158 
In January 1989, the new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, demanded a quick 
withdrawal of the Indian troops. The LTTE, which began peace negotiations with 
Premadasa, joined Colombo in demanding the Indian withdrawal. The Indian 
government took time to react to the demand for the IPKF's withdrawal. The new Indian 
Prime Minister, V.P. Singh finally withdrew the Indian troops by the end of March 
1990.159 
Tamil separatist groups were able to mount a serious challenge to the Sri Lankan 
security forces in the 1980s because they were able to avail of direct military assistance 
from India. When India signed the peace accord with Sri Lanka, the militants lost their 
source of military support. It is unlikely that they can now overcome the Sri Lankan 
security forces with their own meager resources. In signing the Accord, India indicated 
its lack of further desire to help the Tamil militants establish a separate state. In 
retrospect, India signed the Accord because it was to its best interest. If it had chosen 
otherwise, it would have encouraged separatist in the Punjab, Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and 
other regions to break away. It would have also created an anti-Indian Sinhalese state 
which would be prejudicial to the security of India. The collaboration between India and 
Sri Lanka revealed a mutual interest for self preservation that overrode the principle of 
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self-determination of an ethnic group.160 
The Colombo government realize that the only way to end the costly military 
operations and preserve the territorial integrity of the State is through a devolved system 
of government that is acceptable to the Tamils and essentially endorsed by India. In 
signing the Peace Accord, the Sri Lankan government reaffirmed that the state is multi- 
ethnic and multi-lingual and that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic 
identity which have to be carefully nurtured. 
The Provincial councils provided the basic framework for devolution. However 
this would take sometime to implement because of the natural tendency of an 
administration that is accustomed to centralized control to resist change. Also it is 
difficult to create quickly a new resource base for a new layer of administration in a 
resource poor-country. For integration to succeed, Sri Lanka has to revive its sagging 
economy. Sri Lanka's future economic prosperity, however will only partly depend on 
internal factors. It will also depend on the international economic environment, 
especially on aid and capital flows and on continuing access to western markets. 
The Sri Lankan case suggest that the odds are largely against secessionists who 
wish to redraw existing political boundaries to create new states. For various reasons 
the international community generally disapproves of this method of solving ethnic 
conflicts. This case illustrate that the preferred solution is devolution, a subject which 
is bound to occupy the center stage in national integration processes in the 1990's in 
many ethnically divided societies. For the conflict to be solved peacefully and in a 
democratic manner, the Sri Lankan government must make substantial concessions in the 
form of enhanced devolution or federalism to the country's minority population.161 
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B.  BANGLADESH CASE 
Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state through the break-up of Pakistan in 
1971. To better understand why the Bengalis, who populate the former East Pakistan, 
chose to initially support the struggle to gain Pakistani independence in 1947 and later 
decided to form their own state, we have to examine the events that led to break up and 
the emergence of Bangladesh. 
1.  The People of East Pakistan 
The partitioning of British India gave way to the creation of the state of Pakistan 
in 1947. The state of Bengal was also partitioned, with East Bengal forming the East 
wing of Pakistan. The majority of the people of the east wing are Bengalis, 85 percent 
of whom are Muslims. Prior to the partition, Hindus owned and controlled most of the 
land that the Bengalis cultivated. After the partition, many of the Hindu landlords and 
officials in key positions in East Pakistan migrated to West Bengal creating a power 
vacuum in the East Bengal society. Only a few educated East Pakistanis were available 
to take their place. To remedy the situation officials from the west wing transferred to 
the east. The Bengalis were unhappy over the arrangement for it increased dominance 
of the Urdu speaking Muslims from the west wing.162 
Bengali Muslims played an indispensable role in Pakistan's struggle for 
independence from British rule in the 1940s. To emancipate themselves from Hindu 
landlords and money-lenders, the Bengalis supported the All-India Muslim League in its 
bid for independence. The immediate objective at that time was to get rid of Hindu 
domination. As a result of the overwhelming endorsement by the Bengali Muslims to 
the concept of Pakistan, the Lahore resolution providing for two states was rescinded by 
a conference of all Muslim Leaguers summoned by Jinnah.163 
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2. The People of West Pakistan 
The majority of the people of West Pakistan are Urdu speaking Muslims. They 
received preferential treatment in recruitment to the army and civil bureaucracy during 
the British colonial rule and continued to receive the same kind of treatment in the post 
Pakistan period. Most of the Muslims in the west are land owners. The capacity of the 
west wing to progress more rapidly than the east wing was reinforced with the preferred 
migration of Muslim entrepreneurs and traders from minority provinces in India to West 
Pakistan. As a result, the civil-military bureaucracy, the commercial-industrial gentry and 
the landed oligarchy became the dominant social forces in the west.164 
3. Imbalance in East-West Pakistan Relations 
In spite of the important role they played in the formation of Pakistan and their 
greater number (Bengalis constitute 54 percent of the total population) the Bengalis 
quickly came under the domination of the non-Bengali Urdu-speaking Muslims in the 
new state.   Their lack of effective representation in the League made this so. 
The non-Bengali power elite decided that the capital of the state and the 
headquarters of the defense forces should be situated in West Pakistan. Dominance of 
the Urdu speaking Muslims was also evident in East Pakistan. Urdu speaking Muslims 
manned all key post in the East Pakistan Secretariat. Compounding the problem was 
the government decree designating Urdu as the only state language despite the fact that 
not even one percent of the Bengalis spoke the language. East Pakistan was also 
economically exploited by the west wing in the classical colonial pattern. As the largest 
producer of jute, East Pakistan contributed a large portion of Pakistan's foreign exchange 
earnings. Profits earned from East Pakistan's agricultural produce were not however 
channeled back but rather invested in the industrial and commercial sectors in the west 
wing. No effective steps were undertaken to develop import substitution industries in 
East Pakistan. The foreign trade balance from 1948-9 to 1966-7 showed that East Bengal 
had a cumulative surplus of 4,878.7 million rupees. In spite of the surplus, figures show 
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that it had a deficit trade balance of 5,712.1 million rupees with West Pakistan during 
the same period. East Pakistan's share in development expenditures under the 2nd 
(1960-5) and 3rd (1965-70) Five year plan were 31 % and 36 % respectively while the 
West had 69 % and 64% respectively. The Bengalis found themselves in a new kind of 
subordination to Karachi and Lahore.165 
The central government's response to Bengali demands for parity rights did not 
lead to accommodation but rather to confrontation. The first demand that led to 
confrontation was the language controversy. The Pakistanis only agreed to the Bengali 
demand that their language be made one of the state languages of Pakistan, after they 
were forced to do so by the blood of the Bengali language martyrs in February 1952.166 
The question of representation was another source of conflict between the two wings. 
The Bengalis persistently clamored for a parliamentary form of government based on the 
principle of 'one man, one vote' to turn their advantage of numbers into political power. 
The completion of the Constitution was delayed for nine years because of this issue. To 
curb the political power of the Bengalis, the West Pakistani power-elite pushed the 
establishment of parity in representation in the National Assembly between the two 
wings. Political parity was accepted by the East Pakistanis on the understanding that it 
would also apply in the economic, administrative and military sectors. Despite 
government efforts, parity between the two wings was not achieved quickly.167 
The Bengalis demand for regional autonomy fell on deaf ears. The central 
government opted for a strong center, giving the impression that this alone could hold 
the two wings of Pakistan together. The military take-over under General Ayub Khan 
in 1958 formalized the political dominance of the civil-military bureaucracies of the West 
which lasted till the disintegration of Pakistan.   The Ayub period contributed to the 
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radicalization of the Bengali demand for autonomy.168 
4.   The Awami League 
The Awami League (People's League) emerged as the embodiment of the Bengali 
nationalist movement. In 1966, Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman set forth the Six 
Point Program that would guide the League in coming up with its election program. 
These points were: (1) establishment of a federal government through free and regular 
elections; (2) the federal government would have control over foreign affairs and defense; 
(3) movement of capital from east to west would be controled by a separate currency or 
fiscal account; (4) the power of taxation would rest at the provincial level with the 
federal government subsisting on grants; (5) each federated unit would be free to enter 
into foreign trade agreements and control its own foreign exchange earnings; and (6) each 
unit would raise its own militia. The program aroused the same amount of enthusiasm 
among the East Pakistanis as the Pakistani cry for independence in the 1940s.169 
The central government of General Khan found the six point program 
unacceptable on the ground that it smacked of secessionism. Ayub's non appreciation 
of the autonomist sentiments of the Bengalis led the latter to make even more radical 
demands. Ayub ordered the arrest of Mujibur Rehman on 23 April 1966 hoping that it 
would undermine the developing autonomist sentiments in East Pakistan. He only 
succeeded in creating the opposite sentiment. Growing opposition to his regime caused 
Ayub to capitulate. He first dropped the Conspiracy case against Rehman and later 
released him. Ayub held a Round Table Conference on May 1969, hoping to stem the 
opposition to his regime. When the Conference failed to move towards a resolution of 
the problems facing both wings, violence erupted. Ayub was forced to hand over power 
to General Yahya Khan who promptly declared Martial Law.170 
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5. The 1970 Elections 
The results of the elections on 7 December 1970 indicated the polarization of 
popular feelings between East and West Pakistan. The Awami League headed by 
Rehman won 160 out of 162 seats and received 74.9 per cent of the popular vote in East 
Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the Awami League failed to win any seat while Bhutto's 
People's Party won 81 out of the possible 138 seats. The West Pakistanis realized that 
with a Bengali majority in the National Assembly, their primacy is in jeopardy. Bhutto 
and his People's Party tried to delay the convening of the National Assemby. After 
recognizing the developing secessionist movement in East Pakistan, Yahya announced on 
13 February 1971 that the National Assembly would meet on 3 March  1971.171 
6. Rise of a Secessionist Movement 
A powerful opposition movement emerged in East Pakistan in the fall of 1970. 
The military committee of the Awami League started as a paramilitary band under the 
leadership of a retired Pakistani Army officer, Colonel M. A. G. Osmany. As the 
political struggle between East and West Pakistan intensified, the military arm evolved 
into a conventional, but illegal, armed force. The membership of the force came from 
the East Pakistan Students League, the security militia called Ansarsf Arabic for helpers), 
and Mujahids (holy warriors). The group became known initially as the Mukti Fauj 
(freedom fighters) and later as Mukti Bahini.172 
A cracked down launched by the Pakistani armed forces on 25 March 1971 led 
to the shift in loyalty of the East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles to the side 
of the Mukti Bahini. Most of the East Pakistani police and their auxiliaries also joined 
the revolt on the side of the rebel forces. The wholesale defection of the Bengalis from 
the Pakistan Army in the early weeks of the war surprised the Pakistani military 
command.    The amalgamation of forces grew into a unified military force as it 
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confronted the Pakistanis.173 
Border clashes between Indian and Pakistani armies also occurred during this 
period. An Indian incursion into East Pakistan in late November became an excuse for 
Pakistan to launch a series of preemptive air strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December 
1971. This triggered India to order a national mobilization and launch a full-scale 
invasion of East Pakistan the following day. The Indian strategic plan called for 
containment of West Pakistan while its main thrust was to defeat the enemy in East 
Pakistan. The combined force of nine infantry divisions with attached armor units and 
support arms advanced in five columns toward the capital of Dhaka. The Mukti Bahini 
fought side by side with the Indian forces with at least three brigades. On 16 December, 
Dhaka fell and Pakistani's commander, Lieutenant General A.A.K. Miazi with about 
75,000 troops surrendered to Lt. General J.S. Aurora, the Indian commander of the 
combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces. After consolidating their victory and helping 
stabilize the new government, Indian military forces returned to India on 12 March 
1972.m 
The case of Bangladesh demonstrates that the decline of colonial empires in the 
post World War Two era caused the introduction of potential sources of conflict in the 
International system. The origins of these conflicts could be traced to the nature of the 
colonial disengagement arrangements. The failure of colonial powers to work out clear 
cut plans for transferring power to the native elites, give rise to ethnic violence both 
within and across national borders. 
The major ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences between East and West 
Pakistan resulted in a very fragile unity. This was further aggravated by the great 
disparity in their economic status and the physical distance between the two wings. These 
factors proved to be unsuitable to the development of an integrated national political 
structure and a national ideology which would form the basis of nationhood. The 
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emergence of Bangladesh was inevitable when the short-sightedness of West Pakistani 
leadership and the wide gulf between the political structures of the East and West led to 
the formation of the Secessionist Movement and the degeneration of the conflict into a 
civil war. 
C.  THE BURMA CASE 
1.  British Colonial Period 
As a colonial power, British initial interest in Burma had been secondary to their 
main concern which was India. Concerns over security, after some disputes along the 
frontier, led to the annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim in the first war of 1824-6. 
Further annexation of other parts of the territory were done piecemeal until the threat of 
French influence caused the annexation of Upper Burma. Finally in January 1886, the 
whole of Burma was annexed as a province of India. Evolution of a distinctive and 
separate form of administration for Burma took a long time to form. The Morley- 
Mindto reforms of 1909 started the series of reforms to bring about change. In 1935, 
the Government of Burma Act was introduced as a limited form of Home Rule. 
Separation from India finally occurred in 1937.175 
The British applied the policy of 'divide and rule' in the colonization of Burma. 
Recruitment into the armed forces was preferred to come from the minority ethnic 
groups, most especially from the Karens. Local Karen villagers served as guides for the 
British Army in the wars of 1824-5 and 1852-3 and Karen troops played a vital role in 
suppressing the rebellions in Lower Burma in 1886 and the Saya San rebellion of 1930- 
32. The figures in 1939 showed that there were only 472 Burmans in the British Burma 
Army, as compared to 1,448 Karens, 886 Chins and 881 Kachins.176 
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Believing that the various groups are unassimilable, the British kept the Karens 
apart from the Burmans, who in turn were kept distant from Kachins and so on. The 
British intentionally favored the minorities over the Burmans to keep the latter weak and 
thus perpetuate British colonial power. As a result of the special treatment given to them 
by the British, Karens soon developed a separate identity from the rest of the ethnic 
groupings. The conversion of a great number of Karens to Christianity accelerated the 
creation ofthat distinct identity. By the mid 1800s, Karens saw themselves as a racially 
distinct group with a set of shared customs and ancestry. The close relationship between 
the Christian missionaries and Karens was strongly resented by the Burmans. 
2.  The Karen National Association 
As the Karens acquired better education, they became aware of their roots and 
this inspired them to move for the unification of the various Karen groups. The Karen 
National Association (KNA) was formed in 1881 as a vehicle to unite all Karens.177 
The KNA opened its membership to all Karens regardless of religion or location. It 
aimed to promote Karen identity, leadership, education and writing and bring about 
social and economic advancement for the Karens. A small group of educated Sgaw and 
Pwo Karens, mostly teachers from Bassein, Rangoon Insein, Moulmein and Tavoy, 
dominated the association. Virtually all the leaders were Christians, several of whom 
studied in Britain, the United  States and in Europe.178 
KNA members began arming themselves after the 3rd Anglo-Burmese War of 
1884-6 when many Burmans took revenge on Karens whom they accused of being British 
lackeys. The fight against the Burmans provided the impetus for the Karens to seek a 
state of their own.179 
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Initially in the Chelmsford-Montagu hearings in India in 1917, the Karens 
opposed the nationalist bid for independence when they argued that Burma was not 'yet 
in a fit state for self-government' since it was 'inhabited by many different races, 
differing in states of civilization,. . . religion and social development' which could take 
years of 'strenuous training under British governance' to rectify. The Karens later 
changed their stand in 1920 with the granting of Home Rule. KNA chief spokesman 
Sidney Loo Nee, in criticizing the Craddock Reforms argued that the Karens, as Burma's 
second largest indigenous race, should have their interests and identity protected by 
separate electorates and thus 'advance step by step with the Burmans'. Despite Burman 
objections, the British granted the Karens five (later twelve) seats in the Legislative 
Council of 130 (later 132) members.180 
Increased activity of the Burmese national liberation movement alarmed KNA 
leaders. They felt that communal representation was not enough to protect Karen 
interest. The decline of Karen-speakers in the Delta alarmed Karen leaders of the 
increase in the rate of assimilation into the Burman culture. They felt that Karen 
interests especially in the schools and the judiciary were being seconded to the Burman 
position. 
Proposal for the creation of an independent Karen State was first articulated by 
Dr. San C. Po, widely regarded 'father' of the Karen nation, in 1928. In his book 
"Burma and the Karens", he wrote: 'It is their desire to have a country of their own, 
where they may progress as a race and find the contentment they seek. . . "Karen 
Country," how inspiring it sounds.' His vision was akin to Great Britain, where he 
compared the Burmans, Karens, Arakanese and Shans to English, Welsh, Scots and Irish. 
He associated the Karens to Wales.181 
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3.   The Second World War 
When World War II broke out, the Burman majority saw an opportunity to launch 
a major uprising to attain national independence from the British. The Burma 
Independence Army (BIA) fought on the side of the Japanese believing that they would 
be rewarded with Burma's independence. Alliance with Japan did not result in the 
attainment of Burman independence. A shift in alliance occured on August 1944 with 
the formation of a new front called the Anti-Fascist Organization later known as Anti- 
Fascist People's Freedom League(AFPFL), this time to fight against the Japanese.182 
The majority of Karens and their close Karenni cousins chose to remain loyal to 
the British through out the whole duration of the war. Many joined the British 
underground forces while others withdrew to India with the British. Over 12,000 
weapons were air drop by the British to these groups. They proved valuable in the fight 
against the Japanese by inflicting considerable damage to the Japanese forces.183 
During the war, communal strife between Christian Karens and Burman 
nationalist aggravated the division between the two groups. Fighting between Burmans, 
Karens and Indians occurred in Papun and Myaungmya districts and in the outlying areas 
of the Delta in the first half of 1942. The hostilities resulted in thousands of fatalities 
among the Karens. The Japanese later on brought the hostilities under control and for 
the rest of the war only sporadic fighting occurred. The killing of Karens was 
precipitated by Burman belief that the former were potential fifth-columnists. The 
conflict left lasting mutual distrust between the Burmans and the Karens.184 
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4.  Bid for a Separate Karen State 
A draft of the Constitution presented by the Constituent Assembly in 1947 failed 
to provide for a Karen state. Instead it contained a provision which stated that the final 
designation and status of a Karen territory and political rights would be left to be decided 
after independence. This was not acceptable to the Karens. The All Karen Congress was 
organized at Rangoon on February 1947 and Karens agreed to merge all existing Karen 
parties into a new organization, the Karen National Union (KNU). They further agreed 
to push for the creation of a separate Karen State with a seaboard, continuance of racially 
exclusive Karen units in the armed forces, increased number of seats in the Constituent 
Assemby and a new ethnic census of Burma. In spite of Karen objections, the British 
went ahead with the recognition of Burmese independence which was formalized in a 
treaty signed by Clement Attlee and U Nu on 17 October 1947. The Karens, under Saw 
Ba U Gyi were dismayed that the British would agree to the treaty in spite of strong 
Karen reservations to it.185 
Saw Ba U Gyi began active planning for revolt, to establish a Karen-Mon state 
to include all of Tenasserim, Salween State and some adjacent territory. U Nu tried to 
reduce tension among the minority group by the creation of the Regional Autonomy 
Enquiry Commission. In an effort to prevent the outbreak of the rebellion U Nu met 
with San C. Po, Saw Ba U Gyi and other Karen leaders on several occasions. U Nu's 
enemies however took the opportunity to attack him as being pro-Karen. Nothing came 
out of the negotiations.186 
5.  Outbreak of Hostilities 
Efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem proved elusive and by mid 
January 1949, the Karen National Union's military arm, the Karen National Defense 
Organization (KNDO), began disarming government officials just seven miles out of 
Rangoon.  On 31 January 1949, the rebellion was in full swing with the occupation of 
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Insein by the Karens. The wholesale mutiny of the Karen Rifles and later one regiment 
of the Kachin Rifles gave the initial edge to the Karens. The general plan was for 
various Karen forces to converge on Rangoon. Columns from Prome, Toungco, Bassein 
and Insein all set out for the capital. The first three were checked by military units that 
remained loyal to the national government. The column from Insein came within four 
miles of Rangoon before being held up by a scratch force of pro-government militia, 
army regulars, Sitwundans, Gurkhas and PVOs sent in to defend the capital.187 
Government forces regained control over Mandalay, Maymyo, Insein and Thaton 
and carried the fight to the Shan States, Karenni and Pegu State. By 1950, the long 
struggle between the government and Karen guerillas on the western border began. The 
Burmese government dealt a serious blow to Karen leadership with the death of Saw Ba 
U Gyi and some associates in an ambush in August 1950. Joshua Poo Nyo assumed the 
leadership of KNU. His autocratic methods was not well received so his stay in said 
position was short lived. Skaw Ler Taw was finally selected to lead the KNU on 
December 1954.188 In July 1950, U Nu offered amnesty to the Karen rebels but very 
few availed of it. Karen policemen who were suspended when rebellion broke out were 
reinstated back into the Rangoon Police Department. On the political side, U Nu 
established the Karen State out of the old Salween State in 1952. The United Karen 
League (UKL) was established outside the Karen State to succeed the Karen Youth 
Organization. Inside the Karen State, the United Karen Organization (UKO)was also 
established. The two parties contested power over Karen affairs in the Union of Burma 
until 1956.189 
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6.  Ne Win's Rise to Power 
On 26 September 1958, U Nu hand over power to the Army Chief of Staff, Ne 
Win to avert a coup of the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) . Ne Win's job was to form a 
new government which would be in control, until the next elections could be held. On 
28 October, U Nu formally resigned in favor of Ne Win, who was elected prime minister 
by an uncontested vote. U Nu returned to power when his 'clean' AFPFL party won the 
general elections in February 1960. His triumpt was symbolic of the country's verdict 
on Ne Win's military rule. Despite its popular mandate, U Nu's government lasted only 
two years.190 
A determined effort of the Shan and Kachin separatist movement gained 
momentum in 1962. This gave Ne Win the excuse to seize power in a military coup in 
March of that year. This brought to an end the brief era of parliamentary democracy in 
Burma. With Ne Win at the head of the government a full scale operation was launched 
to defeat the rebels. The breakdown of peace talks with many of the insurgent leaders 
in Rangoon in 1963 gave an added impetus to the military crackdown. In 1974 a new 
constitution was introduced and the one party rule of the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party (BSPP) and Ne Win's unique 'Burmese Way to Socialism' were ratified by a 
national referendum.191 
No change in the status of the rebellion occurred with Ne Win in control of the 
reigns of the government. Karens still controlled the border areas with Thailand from 
just north of Victoria to the boundary with Kayah State. During the dry season, 
government troops would conduct operations against the rebels and when the rains come 
they would withdraw and the Karens reestablish themselves. 
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7.   Support for the Rebellion 
The Karen rebels received little overseas support in its fight against the 
government. To finance the rebellion, Karens assess a tax of about 5 percent of all 
goods crossing their areas. They were able to dominate the cross border trade at the 
Burma-Thai border. A black market flourished to compensate the deficiencies in local 
production. Considerable amount of goods coming from Thailand to Burma passed 
through Karen areas. To pay for these goods, unprocessed agricultural products and 
minerals like cattle, rubber, rubies and teak were transported in the opposite direction. 
In 1984 alone, the lumber trade kept sixty five Karen saw mills busy, supplying Teak to 
Thailand. Income derived from the trade supported Karen troops and bought them 
weapons. Although the Burmese government finds the black market troublesome, it 
recognized Burma's need for it. The government has not pressed too hard to curtail this 
trade. The black market trade symbolizes Burma's economic decline and the abihty of 
the insurgents to run their own governments.192 
In 1992, the Burmese army launched a massive assault on the Karen rebel camp 
of Manerplaw (Field of Victory) on the banks of the Moei river at the border of Thailand 
and Burma. The operation which deployed more than 10,000 troops failed because of 
the army's outdated tactics and unfamiliarity with the area. A unilateral ceasefire was 
declared by the Army and efforts were focused on consolidating forward positions and 
familiarizing themselves with the terrain. Opportunities to weaken the Karen fighters 
were also looked into. The opportunity presented itself when Buddhist rank and file 
members of the Karen rebel force mutinied against the predominantly Christian 
leadership in December 1993. These mutineers guided the Burmese army through secret 
trails into the Karen redoubt at Manerplaw. Unable to defend the camp, the Karen rebels 
burned it on 26 January 1995 before withdrawing into the mountains or fleeing into 
Thailand. The Burmese army is expected to hand over Manerplaw to the break-away 
Karen faction, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.   This group will most likely be 
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afforded the same status as other ethnic rebel armies that have made peace with the 
ruling junta and will probably represent the Karens in the National Convention in 
Rangoon.193 
The Manerplaw operation was followed by another attack on the Karens 
Kawmoora redoubt on 22 February 1995. Following intense Burmese army shelling of 
the KNU position, the Karens abandoned the last bastion of Karen resistance on Burmese 
soil. This does not however mean the end of Karen resistance to Rangoon. Diplomats 
and intelligence sources in Thailand agreed that prolonged conflict is possible. KNU will 
probably attempt to wage guerilla war from Thai territory. On the other hand, the 
Burmese military has shown in the past that it will not hesitate to violate Thai territory 
just so it can pursue the insurgents. Although the Thai government expressed warnings 
that continued fighting would sour the relationship between Thailand and Burma, it is 
unlikely that the it will abandon constructive engagement with Burma.194 
In spite of the capture of major rebel camps, the Karen rebellion continues to be 
a major irritant to the Burmese government. Resources which could have been channeled 
to the development of the country continue to be spent trying to defeat the Karens. 
There seems to be no sign of the Karens relenting. With the governments inability to 
increase incentives to entice sufficient number of rebels to lay down their arms, the 
possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict is remote. 
D.    ASSESSMENT 
The ethnic secessionist problems in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and 
Burma had their origins during the colonization period of respective countries. The 
policy of "divide and rule" practiced by various colonizers, whether Spanish, British or 
American, spawned the idea of separate identity for the various ethnic groupings. 
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Geographical, religious, cultural and economic factors were the predominant influences 
in the propagation of the secessionist spirit in these countries. 
In all four cases, ethnic minorities felt that they were discriminated against by the 
majority sector of the state and the fear of ethnic domination drived them to seek 
autonomy or secession. Disparities in development at the disadvantage of the minority, 
bred jealousy resulting in the feeling of being oppressed. 
The involvement of an outside power was instrumental in the escalation of the 
conflict in three of the four cases. The support given by Libyan leader Maummar 
Qaddafi and former Sabah minister Tun Mustapha to the MNLF gave it the strength to 
challenge central authority in the 1970s. Indian support especially that of the state of 
Tamil Nandu to the Tamils in Sri Lanka caused an escalation of the conflict in the 1980s. 
The support given by India to East Pakistan in its bid to separate from Pakistan gave rise 
to the establishment of the state of Bangladesh. The withdrawal of foreign support to the 
rebel movements resulted in the dissipation of secessionist activity, unless the local 
source of funds was sufficient to sustain or even expand the movement. In Burma, the 
Karens compensated their lack of foreign support with the lucrative black market trade 
in the border regions with Thailand. This was profitable enough to support the 
maintenance of the organization and to buy its arms and ammunition. 
The use of military force by the central government in all four cases were 
unsuccessful in solving the separatist/secessionist problem in these countries. Aside from 
the tremendous amount of resources spent in these military operations, the degree of 
animosity between the two sides tend to get deeper with armed confrontation. 
In the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, scholars like W. H. Morris-Jones, K. B. 
Sayeed, Rounaq Jahan and G. W.Choudhury, say that Pakistan might have been saved 
if the rulers had not resorted to the 'military solution'. Harun-or-Rashid thinks this is 
untenable. According to him it was not a matter of choice on the part of the Pakistani 
rulers; rather it was the only recourse they could adopt to safeguard the existing 
relationship between the two parts of Pakistan. The differing social structures, regional 
based nature of the power elite of the state, abnormal geography and the strategy of the 
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capitalist economic growth and development ruined the prospects of permanent 
integration." 
Of the three cases discussed above, the Sri Lanka case appears to have more 
similarities to the Philippine Secessionist problem. These cases effectively illustrates the 
fact that the odds are largely against secessionist who wish to redraw existing political 
boundaries to create new states. The international community tends to disapprove of this 
method of solving ethnic conflicts. Devolution of power appears to be the preferred 
solution to ethnic secessionist problems. 
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The origins of secessionism among the Filipino Muslims traces back to a long 
history of separateness in terms of religion and ethnicity. The effects of an irreversible 
process of demographic and economic change gave impetus to the formation of a 
secessionist movement. The rise against central authority in the 1970s was out of fear 
of assimilation and a desire for an autonomous 'Moro nation'. 
Repressive military actions initially undertaken by the Marcos government to 
solve the Moro problem strengthened rather than diminished these feelings. The Muslim 
rebels found a common cause with other opposition forces to fight the Marcos regime. 
Later attempts to solve the problem in terms of economic and social development were 
less successful because of the lack of appreciation of the religious and ethnic character 
of the rebellion. 
The strength of the secessionist movement peaked during the first half of the 
1970s and abated toward the end of the Marcos regime. Several factors caused the 
MNLF's decline. On the military aspect, the strategy of trying to hold territory against 
government forces who had superior fire power and logistics backup caused the defeat 
in many battles during the early stages of the conflict. The decline in foreign support 
especially arms and ammunition and the cumulative effect of combat fatigue and attrition 
contributed to the decline in armed confrontation. It was however the unrelenting, 
divisive inter-ethnic group antagonism that fragmented the Movement and dissipated its 
strength. 
Marcos' diplomatic moves in the ASEAN region and the Middle East were 
instrumental in diminishing the flow of military support to the rebel movement. It also 
paved the way for peace negotiations to be held between the government and the MNLF. 
The government's policy of attraction, enticing the rebels to lay down their arms and 
participate in government, contributed to the disintegration of the MNLF into various 
factions. While Misuari and his faction of radicals insisted on their secessionist stand, 
most of the traditional elite chose to abandon the goal of secession and accepted Marcos' 
offer to positions in the regional autonomous government. Intensified socio-economic 
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development efforts of the government also help in convincing many rebels to lay down 
their arms. Toward the end of the Marcos regime, the Movement represented a minor 
threat to the government. 
President Corazon Aquino's decision to meet Nur Misuari in Jolo in 1986 
resuscitated the secessionist issue. The moribund leadership of Nur Misuari got a new 
breath of life as a result of the meeting. Ensuing peace negotiations however failed to 
settle the autonomy issue. Misuari was inflexible in his stand of creating an autonomous 
region comprising thirteen provinces. The government was willing to grant autonomy 
to only five provinces where the Muslims are the majority and only after the holding of 
a referendum. The rigid stand of Nur Misuari arose from his perception that Corazon 
Aquino was a weak president and one that could be pressured into agreeing to his 
demands. In focusing the peace negotiations on the Misuari faction, the Aquino 
administration antagonized the other factions. Violent reaction from the latter group 
brought about a change in the negotiation policy of the government. The resultant policy 
widened the participation in the peace negotiations to include all important Muslim and 
Christian groups in Southern Philippines. 
President Fidel V. Ramos, benefiting from the early attempts to find a solution 
to the Moro problem, started his term with the passage of Republic Act 7636, which 
repealed the 35-year old anti-subversion law. This in effect legalized the Communist 
Party of the Philippines and provided a measure of credibility to the Ramos government 
in its bid to bring back the various rebel movements to the mainstream of Philippine 
society. In creating the National Unification Commission and tasking it to conduct peace 
negotiations with the Muslim rebel groups, the Communist Party of the Philippines- New 
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA) and the Reform the Armed Forces Movement- Soldiers of the 
Filipino People-Young Officers Union (RAM-SFP-YOU), the government hopes to 
integrate the various demands to arrive at a solution that is acceptable to the majority. 
The cases of separatism in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma suggest that the 
odds are largely against secessionists who wish to redraw existing political boundaries 
to create new states.    For various reasons the international community generally 
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disapproves of this method of solving ethnic conflicts. The Sri Lankan case illustrated 
that the preferred solution is devolution, a subject that is bound to occupy the center 
stage in national integration processes in the 1990's in many ethnically divided societies. 
For conflicts to be solved peacefully and in a democratic manner, governments must 
make substantial concessions in the form of enhanced devolution to the country's 
minority population. 
The peace negotiations made under President Marcos and President Aquino failed 
because the extent of autonomy that the government was willing to grant the Muslim 
Filipinos was not acceptable to the MNLF leadership. For the conflict in the south to 
be resolved, the government must concede to a reasonable extent the legitimate demands 
of the MNLF for some degree of Islamic autonomy. An acceptable agreement should 
be under terms that will enable the Moro leadership overseas to return to the Philippines 
to participate in it. There is however a need to balance the demands of More rebels 
against the potential dangers of arousing a non-Muslim backlash in the south. If such 
a reaction does occur, tensions of 1971 will be recreated all over. 
It must have dawned on Nur Misuari when he returned to the country in January 
1994, that the chances of success for a separate Moro nation is nil. Misuari has once 
again changed his position from separatism to autonomy when he agreed to resume peace 
negotiations with the Ramos administration. He admitted during a meeting of the peace 
negotiating panel in Zamboanga City last 7 April 1994 that after consultations with 
different sectors in Mindanao, he came to realize that the people are clamoring for peace. 
He must have also realized that the Ramos Administration is more flexible to the MNLF 
demands than its predecessors. This is manifested in the governments willingness to 
discuss the possibility of expanding the area covered by the autonomous region from the 
present four provinces in order to accommodate the MNLF's demand of full 
implementation of the 1976 agreement. 
Despite the seemingly smooth progression of the peace negotiations, there is some 
cloud of doubt on Misuari's sincerity to the peace process. His moving around the 
region with armed followers numbering in the hundreds is causing alarm among the 
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military. The activities of the Abu Sayaff splinter group is another cause of growing 
concern by the government. The MNLF disavowed any connection with the group 
however intelligence sources indicated some connections between them. It could be that 
Misuari is using the Abu Sayaff as a bargaining chip in the peace negotiations. If indeed 
there is no connection between the MNLF and this splinter group, then there is one more 
group that the Ramos administration has to worry about. The April 1995 attack by the 
Abu Sayaff on the town of Ipil in Zamboanga del Sur exemplifies the destruction that this 
group is capable of doing. 
The government should continue availing of the instrumentalities of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference to negotiate with the MNLF. The government must 
avoid the situation where the OIC will change its stand towards resolving the Muslim 
problem. In continuing good relations with the OIC, the government will be in a better 
position to block Nur Misuari's bid for permanent membership in the organization. 
A commitment of sufficient resources for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the 
south would be a clear manifestation of the government's firm resolve to settle the 
Secessionist problem. The government should also initiate moves to help reduce the 
widening income gap between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. Resources should also 
be committed to repatriate the thousands of Filipino Muslim refugees who fled to Sabah 
at the height of the war in the south. Aside from showing the sincerity of the 
government in looking after the welfare of the Filipino Muslims, it would improve the 
relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Muslim Filipinos should however realize that even with a good measure of 
autonomy, they would not be able to resist the socio-political and economic changes in 
a modernizing society. Just like in any traditionally-oriented ethnic minority in a 
developing country, they should expect that gradual integration and partial loss of cultural 




Abat, Fortunate, The Dav We Nearly Lost Mindanao. SBA Printers Inc., Quezon City, 
1993. 
Agoncillo, Teodora, and Alfonso, Oscar, History of the Pilipino People. Malaya Books, 
Quezon City, 1967. 
Baxter, Craig, Bangladesh. A New Nation in an Old Setting. Westview Press, Boulder, 
1984. 
Bunge, Frederica M.. Philippines. A Country Study. The U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1983. 
Farwell,  George,  Mask of Asia.  The Philippines Today.  Frederick A.  Praeger, 
Publishers, New York, 1966. 
Ganguly, Sumit, The Origins of War in South Asia. Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947. 
Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1986. 
Glang, Alunan, Muslim Secession or Integration?. R. P. Garcial Publishing Co., Quezon 
City, 1969. 
Gowing, Peter and McAmis, Robert, The Muslim Filipinos. Solidaridad Publishing 
House, Manila, 1974. 
Grunder, Garel A., and Livezey, William E., The Philippines and the United States. 
University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1951. 
Heitzman, J., and Worden, R. L., Bangladesh. A Country Study.. US Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989. 
Kamow, Stanley, In Our Image. America's Empire in the Philippines. Ballantine Books, 
New York, 1989. 
Kessler, Richard J.. Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1989. 
May, R. J., and Nemenzo, Francisco, The Philippines After Marcos. Billing & Sons Ltd., 
Worcester, 1985. 
123 
Metz, Helen Chapin, Libya.  A Country Study. US  Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C, 1989. 
Premdas, Ralph R., Samarasinghe, S. W. R. de A. and Anderson, Alan B.. Secessionist 
Movements in Comparative Perspective. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990. 
Ross, Russell R., and Savada,  Anrea Matles.  Sri Lanka.  A Country Study. US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990. 
San Juan, E., Crisis in the Philippines. The Making of a Revolution. Bergin & Garvey 
Publishers Inc., Massachusetts, 1986. 
Silverstein,  Josef,  Burma.  Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation.   Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1977. 
Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Billing & Sons Ltd., Worcester, 
1986. 
Smith, Martin J., Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. Zed Books Ltd., 
London, 1991. 
Tindall, George, and Shi, David. America: A Narrative History. W.W. Norton & Co. 
Inc., New York, 1992. 
Williams, L.F. Rushbrook, The East Pakistan Tragedy. Drake Publishers Inc., New 
York, 1972. 
Zaide, Gregorio. Philippine Political and Cultural History. Vol. II, Philippine Education 
Co., Manila, 1957. 
Periodicals: 
Brian, Phelan, "Spectre of Jihad," Far Eastern Economic Review. 14 May 1973. 
Brillantes, Alex B. Jr., "The Philippines in 1992, Ready for Take Off?" Asian Survey. 
Vol.XXXffl, No. 2, February 1993. 
Clad, James, "The Misuari Gamble." Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 September 
1986. 
Clad, James, "Autonomy and Acrimony," Far Eastern Economic Review. 15 January 
1987. 
124 
Clad, James, "Delivering a warning," Far Eastern Economic Review. 29 January 1987. 
Clad, James, "Dampening Demands," Far Eastern Economic Review. 2 April, 1987. 
Clad, James, "Peace talk with Moros stalled," Far Eastern Economic Review. 7 May 
1987. 
Fontaine, Roger W., "The Philippines: After Aquino," Asian Affairs. 1992. 
George, T.J.S., "A Good Idea At The Time," Far Eastern Economic Review. 26 March 
1973. 
George, T.J.S., "For Marcos, The Lesser Danger," Far Eastern Economic Review. 8 
January, 1973. 
Guoxing, Ji, "Current Security Issues in Southeast Asia." Asian Survey. Vol XXVI, No. 
9, September 1986. 
Hubbell, L. Kenneth, "The Devolution of Power in Sri Lanka,    A Solution to the 
Separatist Movement?"   Asean Survey. Vol XXXVH, No. 11, November 1987. 
Israeli, Raphael, "The New Wave of Islam." International Journal. Vol. 34, No. 3, 
Summer 1979. 
Kamalluddin, S., and Tasker, Rodney, "Pressing the Point," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 22 December 1983. 
Lintner, Bertil, "Loss and Exile," Far Eastern Economic Review. 16 February 1995. 
"Marcos talks of change," Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 November 1977. 
McBeth, John, "Sympathetic Ear." Far Eastern Economic Review. 20 May 1993. 
Malloy, Ivan, "Revolution in the Philippines, The Question of An Alliance Between 
Islam and Communism," Asian Survey. Vol. XXV, No. 8, August 1985. 
Noble, Lela G., "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," Pacific 
Affairs. Vol.49, No. 3, 1976. 
Ocampo, Sheila, " Renewed Opposition," Far Eastern Economic Review. 7 May 1982. 
Ocampo, Sheila, "Why the 'water banker' stood," Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 
May 1979. 
125 
Ocampo, Sheilah, "Calling in the neighbors," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 February 
1980. 
"Philippines, Ceasefire Accord," Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 November 1993. 
Ronquillo, Bernardino, "Broken Promise." Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 December, 
1971. 
Ronquillo,  Bernardino,   "The Muslims:  Marcos turns to economics,"  Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 28 February 1975. 
Samad, Paridah Abd., and Abu Bakar, Darusalam, "Malaysia-PhilippineRelation," Asian 
Survey. Vol.XXXH, No. 6, June 1992. 
Shenon, Philip, "Muslim Rebels Attacks Big Philippine City," The Monterey County 
Herald. 5 April 1995. 
Stauffer,    Robert   B.,    "Philippine   Autoritarianism:    Framework   for   Peripheral 
Development," Pacific Affairs. Vol. 50, No. 3, 1977. 
Stockwin, Harvey, "Marcos' Vietnam?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1974. 
Stockwin, Harvey,  "Jolo: Man-made Disaster," Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 
February, 1974. 
Stockwin, Harvey,  "Marcos gain fame from the Muslim," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 8 July 1974. 
Stowe, Judy, "Three-dimensional Muslims," Far Eastern Economic Review. 4 June 
1973. 
Tasker, Rodney,  "The Battle is on for peace," Far Eastern Economic Review. 3 
December 1976. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Rebel's resolve puts the heat on Marcos," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 31 December 1976. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Marcos moves closer to a Southern peace," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 7 January 1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "The Moro Rebellion, Who call the shots?" Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 14 January 1977. 
126 
Tasker, Rodney, "Plebiscite for the South," Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 February 
1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "A step back to the battlefield," Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 
March 1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Uneasy peace after the plebiscite," Far Eastern Economic Review. 29 
April 1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Peace gets another chance," Far Eastern Economic Review. 3 June 
1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Zamboanga waits and worries," Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 
October 1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "Tightrope test for Marcos," Far Eastern Economic Review. 21 January 
1977. 
Tasker, Rodney,  "Marcos' peace manoeuvres," Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 
January 1977. 
Tasker, Rodney, "A Showpiece faces skepticism," Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 
May 1979. 
Tasker, Rodney, " An Islamic Boost for the rebels." Far Eastern Economic Review. 8 
June 1979. 
"The Changing face of death," Far Eastern Economic Review. 27 September 1974. 
Tiglao, Rigoberto, "Hidden Strength," Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 February 1995. 
Tiglao, Rigoberto, "To Fight or Not to Fight," Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 March 
1995. 
Timberman, David G., "The Philippines in 1989." Asian Survey. Vol. XXX, No. 2, 
February 1990. 
Turpin, Alex, "New Society's Challenge in the Philippines," 1982. 
Villegas, Bernardo M. "The Philippines in 1986," Asian Survey. Vol. XXVJJ, No. 2, 
February 1987. 
127 
"Who's Backing the Muslim Rebels?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1974. 
Wideman, Bernard, "All Aboard Marcos' Peace Special," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
2 May 1975. 
Wideman, Bernard,  "An Approach to the Muslim Rebels," Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 22 November 1974. 
Würfel, David, "Southeast Asian Alignments," International Journal. Vol. 29, No. 3, 
Summer 1974. 
128 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. Copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Professor Thomas C. Bruneau 3 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
4. Professor David R. Whipple, Jr. * 
Chairman, Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
5. Professor Claude A. Buss, Code NS/BX 4 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
6. Professor Edward Olsen, Code NS/OS 1 
Department of National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 939433. 
7. N522 ] 
OPNAV 
Rm 4E475, Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000 
129 
8. General Arturo Emile, AFP 
Chief of Staff, AFP 
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo 
Quezon City, Metro Manila 
Philippines 
9. Vice Admiral Pio Carranza, AFP 
Flag Office In Command, Philippine Navy 
Headquarters Philippine Navy 
Roxas Boulevard, Manila 
Philippines 
10. Brig. Gen. Angelino Medina, AFP 
Asst. Chief of Staff for Educ. and Trag., AFP J8 
Camp Emilio Aguinaldo 
Quezon City, Metro Manila 
Philippines 
11. Commander, Naval Training Command 
Fort San Felipe, Cavite City 
Philippines 
12. Defense Attache 
Embassy of the Philippines 
Mass. Ave NW 
Washington D. C. 20036 
13. Captain Ruben G. Domingo 
Blk 17 Lot 11, Queens Row Subd. 
Molino, Bacoor, Cavite 
Philippines 
14. Col. Carlos F. Garcia 
JOQ # 22, Camp Aguinaldo 
Quezon City 
Philippines 
130 
